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THE DEMOCRATIZING POTENTIAL OF
ALGORITHMS?
Ngozi Okidegbe*
Jurisdictions are increasingly embracing the use of pretrial risk assessment algorithms as a solution
to the problem of mass pretrial incarceration. Conversations about the use of pretrial algorithms in
legal scholarship have tended to focus on their opacity, determinativeness, reliability, validity, or
their (in)ability to reduce high rates of incarceration as well as racial and socioeconomic disparities
within the pretrial system. This Article breaks from this tendency, examining these algorithms from
a democratization of criminal law perspective. Using this framework, it points out that currently
employed algorithms are exclusionary of the viewpoints and values of the racially marginalized
communities most impacted by their usage, since these algorithms are often procured, adopted, constructed, and overseen without input from these communities.
This state of affairs should caution enthusiasm for the transformative potential of pretrial algorithms
since they reinforce and entrench the democratic exclusion that members of these communities already
experience in the creation and implementation of the laws and policies shaping pretrial practices.
This democratic exclusion, alongside social marginalization, contributes to the difficulties that these
communities face in contesting and resisting the political, social, and economic costs that pretrial
incarceration has had and continues to have on them. Ultimately, this Article stresses that resolving
this democratic exclusion and its racially stratifying effects might be possible but requires shifting
power over pretrial algorithms toward these communities. Unfortunately, the actualization of this
prescription may be unreconcilable with the aims sought by algorithm reformers, revealing a deep
tension between the algorithm project and racial justice efforts.
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INTRODUCTION

ail decisions are among the most consequential decisions in our criminal
legal system.1 Their outcomes can lead to short-term or long-term incarceration before trial, enacting hardships on defendants, their families,
and their communities.2 Today, bail decisions are increasingly being informed
by pretrial algorithms that utilize an actuarial method and information about
the defendant to determine the likelihood that a defendant will fail to appear
or be arrested for a pretrial crime if released before trial.3 However, these pretrial algorithms have what I term an input problem:4 they inform life-altering
decisions around pretrial release, detention, and electronic monitoring.5 Yet,

Ellen A. Donnelly & John M. MacDonald, The Downstream Effects of Bail and Pretrial Detention
on Racial Disparities in Incarceration, 108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 778 (2018) (“Determinations of bail and detention before trial are crucial decisions that are made before final
court dispositions.”); Shima Baradaran Baughman, Dividing Bail Reform, 105 IOWA L. REV. 947,
960 (2020) (“The consequences of being held in pretrial detention—even for a misdemeanor—can be significant.”).
2 Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor
Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 713–14 (2017) (“This expansive system of pretrial
detention has profound consequences both within and beyond the criminal justice system. A
person detained for even a few days may lose her job, housing, or custody of her children.
[And is at risk of being] convicted more frequently, receive longer sentences, and commit more
future crimes than those who are not [detained before trial]) (on average).”); Crystal S. Yang,
Optimal Bail, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1399, 1417 (2017) (“The private and social costs of pre-trial
detention fall into five main categories: loss of freedom, wrongful conviction, future costs
associated with the collateral consequences of detention, externalities on other members of
society, and finally the administrative costs of jails.”).
3 Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2228 (2019) (“Over the last five
years, criminal justice risk assessment has spread rapidly.”); Kia Rahnama, Science and Ethics of
Algorithms in the Courtroom, 2019 U. ILL. J. L. TECH. & POL'Y 169, 171 (2019) (“These riskassessment tools can match the information obtained from individual criminal defendants with
the patterns observed among past offenders with a similar background and make probabilistic
judgments about defendants' future conduct.”). Though this paper focuses exclusively on the
use of risk assessment algorithms in bail, there is a body of scholarship on their use in sentencing. See, e.g., Jessica M. Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 EMORY L.J. 59 (2017) [hereinafter Eaglin, Constructing]; Erin Collins, Punishing Risk, 107 GEO. L.J. 57 (2018); John Monahan, Risk Assessment in Sentencing, in REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A REPORT OF THE
ACADEMY FOR JUSTICE, BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN SCHOLARSHIP AND REFORM 77 (Erik
Luna ed., 2017).
4 The invocation of the term “input problem” is a double meaning meant to capture both the
fact that these algorithms utilize racially disparate and carceral inputs and that they are designed
and implemented without input from the racially marginalized communities that stand to be
most impacted by these tools’ utilization.
5 Lauryn P. Gouldin, Defining Flight Risk, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 677, 713 (2018); Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490, 492–93 (2018) (“To accomplish that objective, a
growing number of jurisdictions are adopting actuarial risk-assessment tools to sort high-risk
from low-risk defendants.”); Chaz Arnett, From Decarceration to E-Carceration, 41 CARDOZO L.
REV. 641, 672 (2019).
1
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their employment and operation cannot be stopped, shaped, nor influenced by
the racially marginalized communities most likely to be impacted by these algorithms.6
This input problem has three dimensions. First, jurisdictions regularly
adopt these algorithms in opaque ways without consulting racially marginalized
communities, even though these communities are disproportionately affected
by their utilization.7 Second, these communities tend to be shut out of the algorithmic construction process,8 meaning that the factors utilized by these algorithms have not been subjected to community scrutiny.9 Moreover, these
algorithms are often constructed by organizations that have no internal mechanisms for facilitating outsider input about data collection and data utilization.10 Third, even where the public is provided with an opportunity to express
their views about impending pretrial algorithmic governance,11 these participatory systems tend to be unresponsive to those who oppose this form of governance, particularly those hailing from communities that have been devastated by the carceral state. The combination of all of these practices results in
an anti-democratic iteration of pretrial algorithmic governance that maintains
these communities’ traditional marginalization within pretrial governance.12

Eaglin, Constructing, supra note 3, at 88–99 (describing the lack of democratic input that goes
into the construction and implementation of algorithmic tools used in the criminal legal system).
7 Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Visible Policing: Technology, Transparency, & Democratic Control, 109 CAL.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (noting how the secrecy surrounding the adoption processes
around algorithmic systems renders it difficult to track their deployment and use).
8 Algorithmic construction concerns the process of data collection and selection, determination of the meaning of risk in the context of a measurable outcome in pretrial trial system,
selection of predictive factors, and selection of risk thresholds. This process is generally performed by developers and other technocrats with no input from community members: for
more information about algorithmic construction: Eaglin, Constructing, supra note 3, at 73–88.
9 Community groups have discussed this problem at length: see e.g., LEADERSHIP CONF. EDUC.
FUND, THE USE OF PRETRIAL “RISK ASSESSMENT” INSTRUMENTS: A SHARED STATEMENT
OF CIVIL RIGHTS CONCERNS, http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/criminal-justice/Pretrial-RiskAssessment-Full.pdf [https://perma.cc/TQ83-TKGA] (discussing lack of community consultation around algorithmic construction); Eaglin, Constructing, supra note 3, at 108 (stating
“More often, however, the tools are developed by private entities and adopted by jurisdictions
with limited opportunity for expert input and localized feedback.”).
10 Eaglin, Constructing, supra note 3, at 118–21.
11 The Article’s definition of “Pretrial Algorithmic Governance” is informed by and adds to
Hannah Bloch-Wehba’s definition of algorithmic governance which is “the use of automated
decision-making methodologies by governments to inform the policymaking and adjudicative
process.” See Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Access to Algorithms, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1267
(2020).
12 This Article uses the term “pretrial governance” to refer to the creation and implementation
of pretrial laws, policies, and practices.
6
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The input problem is neither exclusive to pretrial algorithms nor to racially
marginalized communities. Indeed, a growing number of scholars, policymakers, and racial justice activists have raised serious concerns over the use of
algorithms in governmental processes, especially since these algorithms are often deployed without meaningful public notice, input, or oversight.13 This is
partially caused by the fact that jurisdictions have tended to outsource the construction, implementation, and ongoing maintenance of such algorithms to the
private sector.14 This privatization has enabled algorithms to escape meaningful public debate and oversight, to the detriment of traditional accountability
metrics.15
But conversations about the absence of public input around algorithmic
governance have largely failed to attend to the particular harms that the input
problem imposes on poor and racially marginalized people.16 For these communities, the input problem goes beyond the fact that algorithmic governance,
as currently employed, is opaque or non-inclusive of the oppressed populations that are most likely to interact with it – though both issues pose barriers
to rendering algorithms accountable to these communities.17 The problem is
that the exclusion of these communities within algorithmic governance operates to reinforce and to legitimize the barriers that already impede their ability
to challenge or to gain control over the very criminal legal institutions responsible for their oversurveillance, overcriminalization, and overincarceration.18

Kate Weisburd, Punitive Surveillance: The (Un)Constitutionality of Non-Carceral Punishment (work
in progress) (draft with author); Bloch-Wehba, supra note 7; Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable Machines, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085 (2018); Elizabeth E.
Joh, Policing by Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth Amendment, 89 WASH. L. REV. 35 (2014); Barry
Friedman and Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827 (2015) (problematizing the lack of democratic input around police use of surveillance technologies.)
14 Bloch-Wehba, supra note 11, at 1272; Kate Crawford, AI Systems as State Actors, 119 COLUM.
L. REV. 1941, 1942 (2019).
15 See, e.g., FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 10-15 (2015) (noting how algorithmic processes are
opaque to everyday citizens, decisionmakers, and to legal processes).
16 But see Dorothy Roberts, Digitizing the Carceral State, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1695 (2019) (reviewing Virginia Eubanks, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR (St. Martin’s Press, 2017)); Jessica M. Eaglin, Technologically Distorted Conceptions of Punishment, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 483 (2019) [hereinafter Eaglin, Technologically].
17 It is important to note that algorithmic governance by private actors did not inaugurate this
exclusion. Rather this exclusion is a hallmark of the pretrial governance, which itself operates
to mute the viewpoints and values of these communities. See Jocelyn Simonson, Democratizing
Criminal Justice through Contestation and Resistance, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1609 (2017).
18 For more information regarding how the particular harms that the criminal legal system
enacts on black people: See Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of
Some of the Causes, 104 GEO. L. J. 1479, 1485 (2016) (describing the vulnerability that Black
13

3

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3835370

The Democratizing Potential of Algorithms?

In the pretrial algorithmic governance context, these communities’ exclusion has already produced tangible and material consequences. Broadly speaking, three consequences flow from their exclusion. First, their exclusion from
algorithmic construction has enabled the production of pretrial algorithms that
maintain existing racial disparities in the pretrial system due to their utilization
of inputs that are racially disparate, carceral, and fail to account for the individual and communal harms that pretrial incarceration enacts.19
Second, the exclusion of these communities within pretrial algorithmic
governance operates as an additional barrier to their efforts to resist a pretrial
system that overincarcerates their community members to the detriment of
their communal safety and cohesion.20 Third, the combination of the first two
consequences threatens to “lock-in”21 the racial status quo and resultingly hamper the ability of these communities to collectively contest the political, economic, and social costs that mass pretrial incarceration, alongside other carceral practices, has had and continues to have on their communities.22 The
people experience at the hands of criminal legal institutions: repeated police interactions, including policing practices, mass criminalization, racial stereotyping, and racial segregation);
Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed to: The Limits of Criminal Justice Reform, 6
FREEDOM CTR. J., 1423–25 (2016) (describing how the racial injustices experienced by Black
people is the objective as opposed to the untended consequence of the criminal legal system’s
operation); Jamelia Morgan, Rethinking Disorderly Conduct, CAL L. REV. (Forthcoming) (discussing the intersection of race and disability in the criminalization, surveillance, and incarceration
of bodies as it pertains to the enforcement of disorderly conduct offenses); Michael Pinard,
Race Decriminalization and Criminal Legal System Reform, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 119, 120
(2020) (“While the criminal legal system particularly infiltrates the lives of poor people, it is
singularly relentless and merciless on Black men, women, and children. It is common
knowledge that Black communities have borne the brunt of mass incarceration, mass convictions, and every other aspect of the criminal legal system.”).
19 Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66
STAN. L. REV. 803, 806 (2014) (contending that neutral inputs can operate as proxies for race
that “can be expected to contribute to the concentration of the criminal justice system’s punitive impact among those who already disproportionately bear its brunt, including people of
color.”).
20 The adverse effects of this exclusion have pushed some community groups to push for
community representation in algorithmic governance: See COMMUNITY JUSTICE EXCHANGE,
AN ORGANIZER’S GUIDE TO CONFRONTING PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT TOOLS DECARCETION CAMPAIGNS 33 (2019), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5e1f966c45f53f2540
11b45a/t/5e35a639a96d977ad27f3ff0/1580574268825/CJE_PretrialRAT Guide_FinalDec2019Version.pdf- [https://perma.cc/YLC4-MR4H].
21 Rebecca Crootof, “Cyborg Justice” and the Risk of Technological-Legal Lock-In, 119 COLUM. L.
REV. F. 233, 235 (2019) (“Translating rules and decision-making procedures into algorithms
grants them a new kind of permanency, which creates an additional barrier to legal evolution.”).
22 Simonson, supra note 17; Dorothy E. Roberts, Democratizing Criminal Law as an Abolitionist
Project, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1597, 1605 (2017).

4
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extent of these consequences should dampen enthusiasm about the transformative potential of algorithms, since unless the input problem is attended to,
well-meaning algorithmic reforms designed to redress racial inequity in the
pretrial system are doomed to reproduce existing barriers to racial justice.23
This result should raise questions about the compatibility of algorithmic governance with efforts to challenge and to resist the racial and socioeconomic
bias and disparity of the current pretrial system and beyond.
This Article explores the consequences of the input problem for racially
marginalized communities and the difficulties associated with its redress. Using
the example of democratic exclusion in pretrial algorithmic governance, its
central claim is that the input problem limits the capacity of pretrial algorithmic
governance to combat racial injustices within the pretrial system, since it contributes to the democratic exclusion experienced by these oppressed communities in pretrial governance. This democratic exclusion, in turn, works to deny
members of these communities the agency to collectively resist mass pretrial
incarceration and pursue their own vision of public safety within the pretrial
context. Redressing this input problem might be possible, but it requires a
meaningful shift in power over pretrial algorithmic governance to this oppressed group and, in so doing, endowing them with control over if and on
what basis algorithmic-based reforms are pursued. But the actualization of this
prescription would be in tension with the intended aims and objectives sought
by proponents of algorithm-based reforms (“algorithm reformers”). On the
other hand, more modest approaches to redressing the input problem risk
largely preserving it, while enabling pretrial algorithmic governance to benefit
from the veneer of communal approval. Given this, this Article concludes that
both the extent of change required to attend to this input problem and the
potential backlash in so attending reveal a deep tension between the algorithm
project and racial justice efforts that is unreconcilable.
This Article makes three contributions to the existing literature. First, it
adds to the current scholarly conversation on algorithms, accountability, and
community participation. Many scholars have explored how the opaque ways
in which algorithms are procured and designed obstruct efforts to subject automated governmental decision-making to public scrutiny and oversight.24 Yet,

Discussing this problem in policing process: see Jocelyn Simonson, Police Reform through a
Power Lens, 130 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2021) (contending that layers of democratic exclusion
in the criminal legal system have facilitated the “reproducing and legitimizing, an unequal,
racialized system of police.”).
24 Bloch-Wehba, supra note 7, at 7; Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Illuminating Black Data Policing,
15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 503 (2017).
23
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these discussions have tended to revolve around transparency without sufficient attention to power.25 Though transparency is a crucial precondition to
rendering algorithmic governance democratically accountable to the public,26
transparency alone cannot attend to the multiple layers of democratic exclusion experienced by oppressed communities. Transparency may redress power
inequities stemming from informational discrepancies existing between government institutions and the public generally.27 It may also increase public participation in algorithmic governance. However, transparency on its own is inattentive to the layers of democratic exclusion that reinforces the political powerlessness experienced by those most harmed by the system, who are thus unable to change the system or dismantle and reconstitute it.28 By attending to
power, this Article expands the contours of the traditional democratic critique
in algorithmic literature and is the first to connect it to the burgeoning set of
criminal procedure scholarship considering the promises and pitfalls of democratizing criminal legal institutions for oppressed communities.29
Second, this Article joins together the racial justice strands of the democratization of criminal law scholarship30 with race critical code scholarship31 to

Ari Ezra Waldman, Power, Process, and Automated Decision-Making, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 613,
615 (2019) (contending that “using algorithms to make commercial and social decisions is
really a story about power, the people who have it, and how it affects the rest of us”); see
Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1258 (2008) (contending that transparency is not sufficient); Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH.
L. REV. 1023, 1024 (2017) (contending that algorithmic transparency is insufficient to redress
algorithmic discrimination because “[e]ven a transparent, facially neutral algorithm can still
produce discriminatory results.”).
26 It is also important to note that for those seeking to subvert existing new technologies for
racial justice aims, transparency is critical: see, e.g., Bennett Capers, Policing, Technology, and Doctrinal Assist, 69 FLA. L. REV. 723 (2018) (contending that techno-policing, such as body cams,
could be harnessed to remake and enhance fourth amendment protections).
27 Bloch-Wehba, supra note 7.
28 Simonson, supra note 17.
29 Simonson, supra note 23; K. Sabeel Rahman & Jocelyn Simonson, The Institutional Design of
Community Control, 108 CAL. L. REV. 101, 115 (2020) (forthcoming) (advocating for endowing
oppressed communities with control over governmental institutions implicating in racial and
class subordination).
30 The Article is engaging with a specific variant of the democratization of criminal law scholarship. This strand is concerned with redressing the democratic harms of the criminal legal
system that has entrenched the subordination of oppressed communities in our society. In this
context, democratization involves endowing these communities with a level of control over
the criminal legal system in order to eliminate these harms. See Roberts, supra note 22, at 1605.
31 RUHA BENJAMIN, RACE AFTER TECHNOLOGY: ABOLITIONIST TOOLS FOR THE NEW JIM
CODE (2020) [hereinafter BENJAMIN, Abolitionist]; SIMONE BROWNE, DARK MATTERS ON
THE SURVEILLANCE OF BLACKNESS (2015); SAFIYA UMOJANOBLE, ALGORITHMS OF OPPRESSION: HOW SEARCH ENGINES REINFORCE RACISM (2018); Ruha Benjamin, Introduction: Discriminatory Design, Liberating Imagination, in CAPTIVATING TECHNOLOGY: RACE, CARCERAL
25
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reveal and to critique the technological determinist32 undercurrent in current
legal scholarship on algorithmic governance and democracy. Thus far, the race
critical code literature and the democratization of criminal law literature have
largely evolved on separate tracks. Tapping into both sets of literature, this
Article rejects the dominant technological determinist framing, in which algorithmic governance is presented as inaugurating the problem of democratic
exclusion. By so doing, this Article argues that algorithmic governance serves
merely to entrench and to legitimate the existing democratic exclusion experienced by racially marginalized people in the crafting and implementation of
criminal laws and policies. This recognition permits us to start to grapple with
the ways in which new technologies reinforce the racial status quo, augmenting, as opposed to creating, the political powerlessness of already disempowered communities to contest and to resist their subordination within the criminal legal system.33
Third, this Article joins a growing set of scholarship considering the congruency between algorithm-based reforms and racial justice efforts. These
scholars question the viability of repurposing algorithmic tools in order to
challenge and to contest structures of power.34 This Article adds another layer

TECHNOSCIENCE, AND LIBERATORY IMAGINATION IN EVERYDAY LIFE (2019) [hereinafter
Benjamin, Technoscience].
32 I use the term “technological determinism” as invoked in TIM JORDAN, HACKING: DIGITAL
MEDIA AND TECHNOLOGICAL DETERMINISM 13 (2008) to refer to the belief that social structures and values are highly shaped and augmented by new technologies. See also BENJAMIN,
Abolitionist, supra note 31; SIMONE BROWNE, DARK MATTERS ON THE SURVEILLANCE OF
BLACKNESS 7 (2015) (cautioning in the context of surveillance not to view “surveillance as
something inaugurated by new technologies [but instead] to see it as ongoing is to insist that
we factor in how racism and anti-blackness undergird and sustain the intersecting surveillances
of our present order.”).
33 Benjamin, Technoscience, supra note 31 at 5 (discussing how “emerging technologies can
reinforce interlocking forms of discrimination, especially when we presume they are insulated
from human influence.”).
34 See, e.g., Sean Allan Hill II, Bail Reform & The (False) Racial Promise of Algorithmic Risk Assessment, UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming) (2021) (contending that pretrial algorithms are incompatible with achieving racial justice aims in the pretrial system); Aziz Z. Huq, Racial Equity in Algorithmic Criminal Justice, 68 DUKE L.J. 1043–1134 (2019) (contending that the racial equity of
algorithms depends on their impact on existing racial stratification); SASHA COTANZA-CHOCK,
DESIGN JUSTICE: COMMUNITY-LED PRACTICES TO BUILD THE WORLDS WE NEED 63 (2020)
(noting that “a prison abolitionist stance does not support allocating additional resources to
the development of tools [such as risk assessment] that extend the [Prison Industrial Complex]
even to make them ‘less biased.”); BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE (2007); Benjamin, supra note 31(raising doubts about the viability of achieving anti-racist ends by utilizing currently employed
technological systems); But cf. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Exclusionary Rule in the Age of Blue
Data, 72 VAND. L. REV. 561 (2019) (contending predictive technologies should be used to
monitor and to check police behavior); Vincent Southerland, A Pragmatic Abolitionist’s Guide to
7
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to this critique by advancing that the solvability of the democratic exclusion
problem caused by algorithmic governance will affect the usefulness of algorithm-based reforms by those engaged in anti-racist projects. If algorithms cannot endow most impacted communities35 with a voice to direct a system that
has traditionally subordinated and muted their interests, then it is of no use to
those in the struggle for racial justice.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I contextualizes the rise of risk
assessment algorithms in the pretrial process and explains their methodology.
Part II details the input problem and explains how currently employed algorithms reproduce and maintain the democratic exclusion experienced by marginalized communities within pretrial governance and beyond. Part III theorizes potential approaches to redressing the input problem. It then sets out a
power-shifting model for combating the input problem: the creation of bail
commissions at the state and federal levels consisting of members of affected
communities who have the power to determine if and on what basis to pursue
pretrial algorithmic governance. Part IV addresses the benefits of this approach. Part V sets out anticipated objections to actualizing this approach and
how these objections signal a potential incompatibility of the algorithm project
with democratizing efforts that are rooted in racial justice.
Two caveats are in order. First, this Article is primarily focused on the
tension associated with redressing the input problem. It makes no claim about
the outcomes that might be achieved through shifting power over algorithmic
governance toward historically disempowered groups. As many scholars have
observed in their explorations of endowing politically and historically marginalized people with control over criminal legal institutions, shifting power guarantees no particular outcome.36 It could spell the end of algorithmic governance or reproduce the same or a more punitive and racially disparate version
of it. The point of surfacing the input problem is to facilitate a greater appreciation for the racial justice implications and first-principle disagreements
about the continuation of algorithmic governance. Second, in critiquing the
lack of power and agency that low income racially marginalized communities
have in algorithmic governance, this Article makes no claim about the role that
developers, criminologists, policymakers, and other technocrats should play in
algorithmic governance, if the power-shifting model is enacted. Shifting power
does not mean the end of reliance on the expertise possessed by technocrats;

the Intersection of Race and Algorithmic Tools in the Criminal Legal System, 53 MD. L. REV. (forthcoming) (proposing that predictive technologies should be used for abolitionist projects).
35 It is important to note that this Article uses the word “most impacted communities” and
“low income racially marginalized communities” interchangeably.
36 Simonson, supra note 23.

8
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rather it spells the dismantlement of the exclusive reliance on this form of expertise. The expected backlash to such a dismantlement reveals one of the several tensions associated with redressing the input problem, demonstrating this
Article’s central claim.
I.

CONTEXTUALIZATION

This Part contextualizes the proliferation of pretrial algorithmic governance. It then sets out the methodology behind currently employed algorithms,
setting the stage for the discussion of the input problem.
A.

The Rise of Pretrial Algorithmic Governance

Pretrial algorithmic governance has become a popular component of recent efforts to reform the pretrial system. 37 Approximately 25% of Americans
live in a jurisdiction that uses a pretrial algorithm. 38 Nearly every state has at
least one county that uses a pretrial algorithm. 39 In the last decade, at least 25
states have either implemented or tabled legislation mandating the use of pretrial algorithms statewide.40 Even New York State, which passed sweeping legislation to curtail the practice of conditioning pretrial release on cash bail for

Shaila Dewan & Carl Hulse, Republicans and Democrats Cannot Agree on Absolutely Anything.
Except This, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/14/us/prisonreform-bill-republicans-democrats.html [https://perma.cc/55Q9-J8U8].
38 PRETRIAL JUSTICE INSTITUTE, THE STATE OF PRETRIAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 13 (2017),
https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=484affbc-d944-5abb-535f-b171d091a3c8&forceDialog=0
[https://perma.cc/X2YG-URT2] (“The good news is that this analysis shows 25% of people
living in the United States now reside in a jurisdiction that uses a validated evidence-based
pretrial assessment.”).
39 Mapping Pretrial Injustice, Where are Risk Assessments Being Used?, https://pretrialrisk.com/national-landscape/where-are-prai-being-used/ [https://perma.cc/BYK7-PYPH]
(last visited Jan. 8, 2021).
40 Alicia Solow-Niederman, YooJung Choi & Guy Van den Broeck, The Institutional Life of Algorithmic Risk Assessment, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 705, 714 (2019) (“In the last seven years
alone, half of U.S. states have either implemented or are seriously considering the use of some
form of risk assessment tools in pretrial settings.”).
37
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most nonviolent offenses, made allowances for the continued use of algorithms in the pretrial setting to determine release conditions.41 The trend towards pretrial algorithmic governance appears set to continue, as political pressure to depopulate jails mounts in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic.42
The expanded reliance upon pretrial algorithmic governance has arisen
from a growing recognition that our current bail system is plea-inducing,43
costly,44 and racially45 and socioeconomically46 disparate. Nearly 500,000 defendants in jail are pretrial detainees.47 This means that 66% of inmates in city
and county jails have not been convicted of a crime but instead are awaiting
trial and the judicial resolution of their case.48 Moreover, the pretrial detainee
population is racially distorted. To illustrate this, it is useful to consider the
racial composition of inmates held in city and county jails, since the majority
of this population is pretrial detainees. Black people constitute 33% of jail inmates, despite constituting only 13% of the population.49 The jail incarceration
rate for Black people (592 per 100,000)50 is more than three times that of White
people (187 per 100,000).51

FY 2020 New York State Executive Budget, Public Protection and General Government
Article VII Legislation, Part AA, 182, https://www.budget.ny.gov/pubs/archive/fy20/exec
/artvii/ppgg-artvii.pdf [https://perma.cc/24W4-SS4B] [hereinafter New York Bail Reform
Law].
42 Rafael A. Mangual, Not Quite Fixed Adjustments to New York’s bail reform leave many of the law’s
holes unplugged, CITY JOURNAL (Apr. 16, 2020) (advocating for the greater use of risk assessment
algorithms in the pretrial system in the wake of COVID).
43 Megan Stevenson & Sandra G. Mayson, Pretrial Detention and Bail, in REFORMING CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: A REPORT OF THE ACADEMY FOR JUSTICE, BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN SCHOLARSHIP AND REFORM 21, 22 (Erik Luna ed., 2017) (“The increase in convictions [following
pretrial detention] is primarily an increase in guilty pleas among defendants who otherwise
would have had their charges dropped. The plea-inducing effect of detention undermines the
legitimacy of the criminal justice system itself—especially if some of those convicted are innocent.”).
44 Id. at 43 (“Pretrial detention has profound costs. In fiscal terms, the total annual cost of
pretrial jail beds is estimated to be $14 billion, or 17% of total spending on corrections.”).
45 Crystal S. Yang, Toward an Optimal Bail System, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1399, 1465–1467 (2017).
46 COLIN DOYLE, CHIRAAG BAINS & BROOK HOPKINS, BAIL REFORM: A GUIDE FOR STATE
AND LOCAL POLICYMAKERS (Feb. 12, 2019), http://cjpp.law.harvard.edu/assets/BailReform_WEB.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A6PS-X5BG] (“This means that a defendant’s release depends upon an ability
to pay. Wealthy defendants walk free while poor defendants languish in jail.”).
47 Kellen Funk, The Present Crisis in American Bail, 128 YALE L. J. FORUM 1098 (2019).
48 Zhen Zeng, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., JAIL INMATES IN 2018, 6 (2018),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ji18.pdf [https://perma.cc/RH35-JA54].
49 Id.
50 Id. at 4, 13.
51 Id.
41
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These figures have fueled momentum around pretrial reform. In theory,
the pretrial system seeks to balance a defendant’s liberty interest before trial
with the societal interest in the incapacitation of dangerous defendants and the
adjudication of criminal offenses.52 Its purpose is to release defendants before
trial, except where their release poses a risk of non-appearance, pretrial crime,
or obstruction of justice.53 In practice, the pretrial process differs from this
ideal. First, a defendant’s pretrial detention is more predicated on ability to
afford the assigned bail bond than the risk of flight or crime.54 Second, judges
often require bail, even though in most cases it is unnecessary to ensure a defendant’s court appearance and law abiding behavior.55 For instance, in bail
schedule jurisdictions, bail judges are mandated to set a predetermined monetary bail amount solely based on the crime charged,56 an amount that bears no
relation to a defendant’s flight or crime risk.57 Similarly, in jurisdictions where
bail is set on the basis of statutory factors, bail determinations are often rushed
and conducted without sufficient attention to the full range of nonfinancial
release options available to manage a defendant’s pretrial risk.58
The greater utilization of pretrial algorithmic governance is one of dozens
of bail reform proposals percolating around the country.59 Pretrial algorithms

Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 43; Yang, supra note 45, at 1416.
Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 43..
54 Megan T. Stevenson, Distortion of Justice: How the Inability to Pay Bail Affects Case Outcomes, 34
J. L. ECON. & ORG. 511, 513 (arguing that “[m]ost people who are detained pretrial are detained due to an inability to pay bail[.]”).
55 Bail is set in most cases because of the assumption that bail is required to ensure a defendant’s appearance or compliance with the law on release. This assumption does not bear out in
practice. See Doyle, Bains & Hopkins, supra note 45, at 12–13 (“Money bail’s connection to
public safety is tenuous at best. Bail is not a means of preventing or deterring a defendant
from committing crimes before trial […] Money bail is not necessary to ensure that defendants
reappear for trial.”); It is also important to note the importance of community bail funds in
undermining the necessity of money bail to prevent pretrial crime and flight. See Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nullification, 115 MICH. L. REV. 585, 591 (2017) (“Community bail funds provide
to the public real-life examples of indigent defendants returning to court without having undermined public safety, despite an expert judicial determination that personal money was
needed to prevent flight and mayhem.”).
56 Samuel R. Wiseman, Fixing Bail, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 417, 445 (2016).
57 In recent years, bail schedules have been the subject of constitutional challenges under the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses for discriminatorily tying pretrial release to monetary amounts unaffordable to indigent defendants without a legitimate or compelling reason.
See, e.g., O’Donnell v. Harris County, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1167 (S.D. Tex. 2017), appeal filed,
No. 17-20333 (5th Cir. May 10, 2017).
58 Cynthia E. Jones, Give Us Free: Addressing Racial Disparities in Bail Determinations, 16 LEGIS. &
PUB. POL’Y 919, 932 (2013).
59 Shima Baradaran Baughman, Dividing Bail Reform, 105 IOWA L. REV. 101 (2020) (noting the
various types of bail reform currently underway in the country); Ben Grunwald, How To Reduce
52
53
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are central to this project and they tend to be risk assessment algorithms that
use an actuarial method and information about the defendant to predict the
likelihood that the defendant will fail to appear or will be arrested for pretrial
misconduct, if released before trial.60 The risk prediction or “risk score” produced is then used as a factor for detaining the defendant or for determining
“the degree of surveillance [the defendant] should be subjected to if released.”61 The measure aims to improve bail decision-making by conditioning
release and detention on a defendant’s riskiness to public safety. 62 The technology is intended to empower bail judges to identify and release low risk defendants and to reserve pretrial detention for high risk defendants. The hope
behind this technology is that bail judges will rely on the assessment supplied
by these algorithms rather than their own subjective views of the defendant’s
riskiness, views that are often riddled with inaccuracy, irrationality, and bias.
Empirical studies demonstrate that bail decisions are susceptible to racial bias.
For instance, a 2017 study by William Dobbie, Jacob Goldin, and Crystal Yang,
which compared the pretrial conduct of marginally released White defendants
with marginally released Black defendants, found that bail judges erroneously
overestimated Black defendants’ pretrial crime risk in comparison to that of
White defendants, whose risk was correspondingly underestimated. More specifically, in their evaluation of 177 bail judges, the researchers found that marginally released White defendants were 22.2% more likely to be rearrested for
alleged pretrial misconduct than were marginally released Black defendants.63
This variance could not be explained by White-Black differences in the characteristics (such as criminal history) or the type of crimes charged among the
study participants.64 Instead, the study concluded that the higher rate in arrests

The Prison Population By X% (work in progress) (manuscript at 60) (draft with author) (contending eliminating bail is one option for reducing prison populations).
60 Mayson, supra note 5, at 509 (“Statisticians develop such tools by analyzing aggregated pretrial data to identify the traits of defendants that correlate most closely with the outcome of
concern. Those traits are deemed “risk factors.” The developers then create a checklist that
assigns each risk factor a number of points corresponding to how closely it is correlated with
the bad outcome in the group data.”).
61 Chaz Arnett, From Decarceration to E- Carceration, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 641, 651 (2019).
62 Mayson, supra note 5, at 492–93 (“The core reform goal is to untether pretrial detention
from wealth and tie it directly to risk. To accomplish that objective, a growing number of
jurisdictions are adopting actuarial risk-assessment tools to sort high-risk from low-risk defendants.”).
63 David Arnold, Will Dobbie & Crystal S. Yang, Racial Bias in Bail Decisions, 133 Q. J. OF ECON.
1885, 1917 (2018) (noting that “[t]aken together, these [results] imply that marginally released
white defendants are 22.2 percentage points more likely to be rearrested prior to disposition
than marginally released black defendants consistent with racial bias against blacks[.]”). Marginally released defendants reflects to the fact that these
64 Id. at 1929 (stating that “[o]ur estimates are nearly identical if we account for observable
crime and defendant differences by race, indicating that our results cannot be explained by
black–white differences in the probability of being arrested for certain types of crimes (e.g.,
12
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for offenses allegedly committed by marginally released White defendants
demonstrated that bail judges were “relying on inaccurate stereotypes that exaggerate the relative danger of releasing black defendants versus white defendants at the margin.”65 In so finding, their study is reflective of prior studies that
have been conducted throughout the country, evidencing the extent to which
racial stereotypes infect and taint the bail determination process.66
The increased use of pretrial algorithms has ignited a fraught debate in bail
reform circles regarding the merits of using predictive technologies in the pretrial process. Algorithm reformers claim that algorithms offer an objective and
evidence-based path towards substantially lowering high rates of incarceration67 and racial and socioeconomic disparities without endangering community safety, by identifying for pretrial release those posing a low risk of nonappearance and arrest for offending.68
At the same time, a racial justice movement has coalesced in opposition to
the use of pretrial algorithmic governance, voicing concerns about its bias,69

the proportion of felonies versus misdemeanors) or black–white differences in defendant
characteristics (e.g., the proportion of defendants with prior offenses versus no prior offenses[.]”).
65 Id.
66 See, e.g., Meghan Sacks, Vincenzo A. Sainato & Alissa R. Ackerman, Sentenced to Pretrial Detention: A Study of Bail Decisions and Outcomes, 40 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 661 (2015).
67 Christopher Slobogin, Preventive Justice: How Algorithms, Parole Boards and Limiting Retributivism
Could End Mass Incarceration, WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 6)
(“The quantified results of well-validated risk assessment instruments can provide a concrete,
rational basis for diversion or release. If, as recommended in this article, adherence to those
results is required in most circumstances, the human urge to incapacitate those in the law’s grasp
can be even more effectively resisted, because decision-makers must obey the objective
facts.”).
68 See, e.g., Wiseman, supra note 56; Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 43, at 21; Sam CorbettDavies, Sharad Goel & Sandra González-Bailón, Even Imperfect Algorithms Can Improve the Criminal Justice System, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/upshot/algorithms-bail-criminal-justice-system.html [https://perma.cc/HP5S-23EG]; Michael
L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the Fourth Amendment, 164 U. PA.
L. REV. 871, 875 (2016) (describing one of the allures of machine learning algorithms as its
ability to ostensibly disaggregate low risk defendants from high risk ones even where the factors that tend to increase a defendant’s probability of committing misconduct is multifaceted);
Mirko Bagaric & Gabrielle Wolf, Sentencing By Computer: Enhancing Sentencing Transparency And
Predictability, And (Possibly) Bridging The Gap Between Sentencing Knowledge And Practice, 25 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 653 (2018) (contending another appeal of algorithmic decision-making is its
promise of rendering consistent and predictable decisions.)
69 Ifeoma Ajunwa, The Paradox of Automation as Anti-Bias Intervention, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 1671
(2020). Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 857, 860
(2017).
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fairness,70 due process,71 and opacity.72 They fear that the increased employment of these algorithms will maintain the racial status quo within the pretrial
system, while simultaneously obscuring – or worse, legitimizing – its existence.73 The above racial justice concerns have begun to materialize.74 Part II
will continue to discuss ways in which the input problem has contributed to
the racial justice challenge presented by algorithmic governance.
The next section of this Article introduces the kind of algorithms being
used in the pretrial process. Its aim is not to provide a comprehensive overview
of the inner workings of all the pretrial algorithms that have been or are being
developed in the country.75 Instead, this Part examines the common features
of these algorithms, setting the stage for the discussion in Part II about how
the current iteration of pretrial algorithmic governance entrenches the input
problem experienced by members from low income racially marginalized communities.

Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data's Disparate Impact, 104 CAL. L. REV. 671 (2016);
Ion Meyn, Big Data and Equal Protection (work in progress) (draft with author).
71 Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice System,
70 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (2018); Natalie Ram, Innovating Criminal Justice, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 659
(2018).
72 Bloch-Wehba, supra note 11, at 1267 (noting that the opacity of algorithmic governance is a
barrier to subjecting algorithms to public scrutiny and debate); But see Jon Kleinberg et al.,
Discrimination in the Age of Algorithms, 10 J. OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 113, 114 (2018) (contending
that “the opacity of the algorithm does not prevent us from scrutinizing its construction[.]”).
73 See, e.g., Ric Simmons, Quantifying Criminal Procedure: How to Unlock the Potential of Big Data in
Our Criminal Justice System, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 947, 982 (2016) (cautioning that moving
toward big data algorithmic solutions risks further entrenching past racial inequities while making them “harder to successfully challenge and expose because they are presented as part of
the ‘hard science’ of big data.”); Eaglin, Technologically, supra note 16.
74 The greater use of this technology has not substantially reduced racial disparities in the
pretrial process. The experience in New Jersey is illustrative. In 2017, New Jersey implemented
PSA statewide, overhauling its cash-based system in favor of a system of detention based on
risk. The switch was lauded as a success, with the pretrial population falling by 20% in its first
year and by 15% in its second year. The racial makeup of the New Jersey pretrial population
has remained constant, despite the reform: GLENN A. GRANT, N.J. JUDICIARY, Criminal Justice
Reform, Jan 1–Dec 31 2018 Report to the Governor and the Legislature, (2019),
https://njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/2018cjrannual.pdf?c=dSE
[https://perma.cc/2W3V-WUDU] (noting that the racial percentage of Blacks in jail in 2018
was the same as 2012. However, between this period, the Latinx population declined by 2%
and the White population increased by 2%). Similar result in North Carolina: CINDY REDCROSS & BRIT HENDERSON, MDRC CENTER FOR CRIM. JUST. RESEARCH, PRETRIAL JUSTICE
REFORM STUDY: EVALUATION OF PRETRIAL JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORMS THAT USE THE PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT EFFECTS IN MECKLENBURG COUNTY NORTH CAROLINA
7 (2019), https://www.mdrc.org/sites/default/files/PSA_Mecklenburg_Brief1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HDP5-ZQDE].
75 There is already substantial scholarship on that point. See generally, Eaglin, Constructing, supra
note 3; Mayson, supra note 5, at 509.
70
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This Article uses the terms “pretrial algorithm” and “risk assessment tool”
to refer to an assessment that employs statistical methods and big data to forecast the likelihood that a defendant will engage in misconduct, thereby meriting
detention.76 Both terms refer to non-automated and automated tools, which
were created by a statistically derived process. Examples include the Wisconsin
2009 Risk Assessment Instrument (a checklist) and more sophisticated tools,
such as COMPAS and PSA.77
B.

Features of Currently Employed Algorithms

Though a relatively new phenomenon in the pretrial process, risk assessment tools have a long and controversial history in penal structures. Their initial use was in parole, where the risk scores that they produced shaped parole
officials’ determinations of an offender’s candidacy for supervised release. 78
Starting in the 2000s, whilst facing the economic consequences of mass incarceration, states and the federal government turned to sentencing risk assessment tools as a low-cost solution to reducing the incarcerated population.79 As
Jessica Eaglin explains, these tools were “meant to limit and shape the exercise
of criminal law actors’ discretion at the systematic level” in order to promote
the release of “low risk” offenders.80 The theory was that the risk scores produced would encourage judges to identify offenders classified as low risk of
recidivism and to divert them to alternative programs. Despite not substantially reducing the incarcerated population in practice, risk assessment tools
became and remain a popular bipartisan tool.81
Pretrial algorithms share the same methodology as their parole and sentencing counterparts. They predict a defendant’s likelihood of pretrial misconduct by identifying the extent to which the defendant’s traits correspond with
the traits of other defendants who have engaged in non-appearance or arrest
for alleged commission of crime.82 These features are referred to as risk factors,
which are either static or dynamic factors.83 Static factors are unalterable traits
that a defendant possesses, such as age of the defendant.84 Dynamic factors

I am adopting the definition provided in Mayson, supra note 3, at 2228. It is worth noting
that none of the pretrial algorithms in use are machine learning.
77 Id.
78 Richard A. Berk & Justin Bleich, Statistical Procedures for Forecasting Criminal Behavior, 12 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 1, 6 (2013).
79 Eaglin, Technologically, supra note 16, at 489–90 (2019).
80 Id. at 504.
81 Id. at 486.
82 Mayson, supra note 5, at 509.
83 Eaglin, Technologically, supra note 16, at 490.
84 Id. at 491.
76
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refer to traits that a defendant currently possesses, but which tailored interventions could alter. Examples include drug dependency or employment status.85
To create these algorithms, statisticians feed a mathematical model with data
about a set of pretrial defendants to identify the traits that statistically correlate
with pretrial flight and crime. Since statisticians have imperfect data about pretrial flight and crime, they program the mathematical model to identify traits
closely associated with a defendant’s failure to appear at trial and rearrests for
a new crime.86 These traits are then deemed risk factors that developers rely
on to create the pretrial algorithm. Within the algorithm, each risk factor is
assigned “a number of points corresponding to how closely it is correlated
with the bad outcome [nonappearance or rearrest] in the group data.”87 The
most common risk factors utilized are employment status, charges currently
pending, prior custodial sentences, past record for failure to appear, drug use,
residential ties, and age.88
Though some pretrial algorithms are made in-house, many jurisdictions
that have made the transition have chosen to rely on privately developed and
owned algorithms. Two popular, privately developed algorithms are COMPAS
(Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions Pretrial Release Risk Scale II) and PSA (Public Safety Assessment). For this reason, the following section provides a detailed view of these two popular offthe-shelf algorithms.
1. Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions Pretrial
Release Risk Scale II (COMPAS)
COMPAS89 is a proprietary and commercially available pretrial risk assessment algorithm that was developed by Northpointe (now Equivant), a forprofit company. The model is the product of an analysis performed on a dataset consisting of 2,831 felony defendants on pretrial release in Kent County,
Michigan, over a three-year period.90 From that analysis, its developers created
an automated algorithm consisting of eight factors: a defendant’s employment

Id.
Mayson, supra note 5, at 509.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 512.
89 The COMPAS system described in this section is the 2019 version of the COMPAS system.
Information about the 2012 version can be found at: NORTHPOINTE, PRACTITIONERS GUIDE
TO
COMPAS
(2012),
http://www.northpointeinc.com/files/technical_documents/FieldGuide2_081412.pdf [https://perma.cc/29PK-2M5R].
90 WILLIAM DIETERICH, EUGENIE JACKSON & CHRISTINA MENDOZA, RISK ASSESSMENT
FACTSHEET: CORRECTIONAL OFFENDER MANAGEMENT PROFILING FOR ALTERNATIVE
SANCTIONS (COMPAS) PRETRIAL RELEASE RISK SCALE II (PRRS-II), https://wwwcdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/COMPAS-PRRS-II-Factsheet-Final6.20.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2AV-Z9JS].
85
86
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status, charges currently pending, prior custodial sentences, past record for
failure to appear, arrests and/or criminal charges on pretrial release, drug use,
most serious criminal offense, and residential ties. Race is not an input. The
information needed to score the defendant is obtained by an interview and
reference to court records as well as case file information.91 The model’s output
is two risk scores, both in the range of 1 to 10. One of the scores predicts the
risk of failure to appear while the other forecasts the risk of a felony arrest.92
The defendant is then assigned a risk classification. Beyond the risk factors
utilized, little is publicly known about COMPAS. For instance, the weight assigned to each risk factor is neither publicly available nor provided to bail
judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, or even the affected defendant.93 Northpointe has been successful in maintaining its secrecy by enforcing it in consumer contracts with procuring jurisdictions and by asserting trade secret privilege.94 As a result, only pretrial agencies and other licensed individuals are
privy to the full inner workings of COMPAS’ scoring process. Currently, two
counties in California, eight counties in Wisconsin, and one county in South
Carolina have adopted the algorithm.95
2. Public Safety Assessment (PSA)
PSA is a pretrial risk assessment algorithm developed by the Laura and
John Arnold Foundation (now Arnold Ventures), a nonprofit foundation,
which offers the model for free. The model was developed by examining a
dataset consisting of 750,000 defendants on pretrial release from approximately 300 different jurisdictions across the United States over a 10-year period.96 Like COMPAS, PSA does not use race or racial information as an input.
Yet, unlike COMPAS, PSA does not utilize socioeconomic factors in its process. It only considers the following static factors: age at current arrest, current
Id.
Id.
93 Id.
94 See, e.g., State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017)
(approving the use of risk assessment tools in the sentencing context). However, it is important
to note that, there has been some recent efforts to limit or eliminate the ability of private
companies to rely on trade secret privilege to shield the methodology of such algorithms in
criminal cases. See, e.g., 2019 Idaho House Bill No. 118; Press Release, Mark Takano, U.S.
Representative, Rep. Takano Introduces the Justice in Forensic Algorithms Act to Protect Defendants’ Due
Process Rights in the Criminal Justice System, (Sept. 17, 2019), https://takano.house.gov/newsroom/ press-releases/rep-takano-introduces-the-justice-in-forensic-algorithms-act-to-protect-defendants-due-process-rights-in-the-criminal-justice-system [https://perma.cc/9VAR2FDD].
95 Dieterich et al., supra note 90; MAPPING PRETRIAL INJUSTICE, A Community-Driven Database,
https://pretrialrisk.com/
96 Kristin Bechtel, Risk Assessment Factsheet: Public Safety Assessment,
https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/PSA-Sheet-CC-Final5.10-CC-Upload.pdf [https://perma.cc/R8QJ-ACXX].
91
92
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violent offense, charges pending at the time of the alleged offense, prior misdemeanor convictions, prior felony convictions, prior violent convictions,
prior failures to appear, and prior incarceration sentences. Information required to score the algorithm does not require an interview. From there, the
model produces three different risk scores, each assigned a weight: failure to
appear risk (scored on a scale of 0-7), new violent crime activity risk (scored
on a scale of 0-13), and new criminal activity risk (scored on a scale of 0-7).97
Weight assignments are publicly available. From that score, the defendant is
provided a risk classification. PSA has been adopted statewide in Kentucky,
Arizona, New Jersey, and at least ten counties outside of those three states.98
II.

THE INPUT PROBLEM

This Part discusses the effect of the input problem on members of historically and racially marginalized communities, specifically how the input problem reproduces and entrenches the exclusion of these communities within pretrial governance and society more broadly. Its aim is not to suggest that the
inclusion of these communities in algorithmic governance would necessarily
lead to pretrial algorithms that would reduce or eliminate the problem of racialized pretrial incarceration. As is discussed in Part III, shifting power over
pretrial algorithmic governance to most impacted communities promises no
particular outcome.99 For this reason, the aim of this Part is solely to lay out
the consequences that the current iteration of pretrial algorithmic governance
has had on these communities, consequences which these communities are
unable to redress due to their exclusion from this form of governance.
The input problem produces multiple layers of democratic exclusion100 for
members of low income, racially marginalized communities. The first layer
concerns the tools themselves and how members of these communities are
excluded from participating in the construction of algorithms used in pretrial
algorithmic governance.101 This results in pretrial algorithms that are constructed with the normative assumptions of their developers, assumptions that
do not necessarily reflect the policies or outcomes that are sought by most
impacted communities.102 The second layer relates to how these communities’
exclusion from pretrial algorithmic governance facilitates their systemic marginalization in the creation and implementation of pretrial law, policy, and

Id.
Id.
99 Simonson, supra note 23.
100Simonson, supra note 17 (discussing the multiple layers of democratic exclusion in the criminal legal system as it pertains to racialized minorities).
101 Eaglin, Constructing, supra note 3, at 88–94.
102 Id.
97
98
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practice more broadly.103 This results in the creation and implementation of
pretrial algorithms that perpetrate the same features of the current pretrial system, features that many in these communities seek to challenge and to resist.
The final layer concerns how the current iteration of pretrial algorithmic governance through its perpetuation of the first two layers of democratic exclusion
operates to undermine efforts to contest the individual and collective political,
economic, and social costs that mass pretrial incarceration alongside other carceral practices has had on these communities.104 This Part will address each
layer of democratic exclusion separately, since each produces a particularized
and severable harm to these communities that in combination renders the pretrial system a site for the reproduction of racial and class stratification.
A.

Exclusion From Algorithmic Construction

A major consequence of communal exclusion from algorithmic construction relates to the inputs relied on in currently employed pretrial algorithmic
systems. These inputs operate to reproduce and maintain racialized pretrial
incarceration by unfairly inflating the risk scores of racially marginalized defendants. To illustrate this problem, the Article uses two examples: (1) the
prevalence of racially disparate inputs and (2) the exclusive use of carceral risk
inputs.
1. Racially Disparate Inputs
Nearly all pretrial algorithms utilize racially disparate inputs. Even though
no pretrial algorithm explicitly uses race or racial information as an input, they
tend to use inputs that are closely correlated with race. For instance, most pretrial algorithms include arrests and/or criminal records as inputs for calculating
risk, both of which are systematically connected to historical and current racial
inequities, including over-policing.105 The COMPAS system considers a defendant’s criminal record, past arrest record, past sentences to incarceration,
and charges pending when calculating a defendant’s risk of re-arrest. Locally
created and validated algorithms, such as the Colorado Pretrial Assessment
Tool (CPAT), tend to take into account past arrests and criminal records. Even
though PSA does not explicitly consider a defendant’s past arrests, past convictions and charges pending are utilized to determine a defendant’s risk of
failure to appear.

Simonson, supra note 17 (discussing the impact of most impacted communities’ exclusion
in pretrial governance generally).
104 Roberts, supra note 22, at 1605 (discussing how carceral practices on black communities
“currently excludes [these] residents from democratic participation [and the] freedom to develop their own democratic alternatives for addressing social harms.”).
105 See, e.g., Anna Roberts, Arrests as Guilt, 70 ALA. L. REV. 987 (2019) [hereinafter Roberts,
Arrests]; Anna Roberts, Convictions as Guilt, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) [hereinafter Roberts, Convictions].
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The use of charges pending, arrests, and past convictions by these algorithms operates to unfairly inflate the risk scores of racially marginalized defendants. When used against Black defendants, these factors are more reflections of historic, racial inequities rather than predictions of a defendant’s propensity for future crime.106 An example of this problem concerns arrest. Black
people experience a higher rate of arrest compared to their White counterparts.107 Though the true rate at which most criminal offenses occur among
different demographic groups is unknown, studies indicate that the rate of
Black arrests does not correlate to the rate of criminal offenses committed by
Black people. An example of this distortion concerns drug crimes: Black people are arrested more often for drug crimes, despite committing these crimes
at similar rates to White people.108 Beyond arrest rates, past criminal convictions and sentences to incarceration are also unreliable proxies for criminal
offending across different subpopulations, since racially marginalized people
are also more likely to be charged, convicted, and sentenced to incarceration
than their White counterparts.109 The data also suggests that prosecutors more

Moreover, this state of affair also inflates the myth of Black criminality which as India Thusi
has argued, facilitates “triggering the perception of Blacks as criminal threats to the community
in the absence of harsh police tactics undermines arguments to recognize Black humanity”;
See India Thusi, Blue Lives & the Permanence of Racism, 105 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 14, 23
(2020).
107 The Department of Justice has released reports on the high rates of Black arrests in New
Orleans, Ferguson, and Baltimore. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE POLICE DEPARTMENT 61 (2016), https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/883296/download [https://perma.cc/EX8F-3574]; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 5 (2015),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F7U2Q3PS]; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT (2011), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2011/03/17/nopd_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5VP-84B7]; see Megan Stevenson &
Sandra Mayson, The Scale of Misdemeanor Justice, 98 B.U. L. REV. 731, 758–59 (2018) (discussing
the disproportionate rate of Black arrests in the context of misdemeanor offenses).
108 See Shima Baradaran, Race, Prediction, and Discretion, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 157, 189–90
(2013) (finding that “black defendants are more often arrested for drug crimes even though
all races commit drug crimes equally.”).
109 Paul Butler, Race and Adjudication, in REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A REPORT OF THE
ACADEMY FOR JUSTICE, BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN SCHOLARSHIP AND REFORM 211, 212
(Erik Luna ed., 2017) (“People of color are more likely to be charged with serious offenses,
jailed prior to trial, convicted, and to receive a harsher sentence. These disparities exist even
when factors like the severity of the crime and the criminal history of the accused person are
the same.”).
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often pursue charges against and offer less favorable plea deals to Black defendants in comparison to White defendants.110
These racial inequities dilute the predictive accuracy of the risk scores produced by present-day algorithms. The 2016 ProPublica-Northpointe debate is
illustrative. In their study on the use of COMPAS in the bail hearings of 7,000
defendants in Broward County, Florida, ProPublica compared the risk classification that the algorithm assigned each defendant with their actual commission of pretrial crime within the two years following their bail hearing.111
ProPublica researchers concluded that COMPAS was racially biased, after
finding that it erroneously flagged Black defendants as at high risk for pretrial
crime more often than White defendants, who were correspondingly mistakenly flagged as at low risk for pretrial crime compared to Black defendants.112
The source of the racial disparity in COMPAS was its consideration of past
arrests, convictions, and sentences to incarceration in the determination of a
defendant’s risk score.113 Because the Black defendants were arrested, convicted, and sentenced to incarceration more often than the White defendants
in the study, the algorithmic system assigned them a high risk classification at
disproportionate rates. This produced a racial disparity, even though COM-

110 See, e.g., Besiki

Kutateladze et. al, Cumulative Disadvantage: Examining Racial and Ethnic Disparity
in Prosecution and Sentencing, 52 CRIMINOLOGY 514, 518, 527–37 (2014) (identifying racial disadvantage in plea deals offered to Black defendants in comparison to other racial groups in
the context of New York).
111 Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias: There's Software Used Across the Country to Predict Future Criminals. And It's Biased Against Blacks, PROPUBLICA, May 23, 2016, https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing
[https: // perma.cc
/HQF7-4YAF].
112 It is worth noting that Northpointe disputed ProPublica’s findings, insisting that their algorithm was racially neutral. In support of their position, Northpointe clung to the predictive
accuracy of the high-risk scores assigned, which showed that two defendants with the same
base rate of arrests received a high-risk classification and were arrested for committing a pretrial crime at nearly identical rates. Both ProPublica and Northpointe’s assertions were correct
but premised on different metrics of algorithmic fairness. ProPublica’s study was concerned
with COMPAS’ non-compliance with the metric of statistical parity, which led the system to
falsely identify Black defendants as at high-risk of pretrial crime at nearly twice the rate of
White defendants. Northpointe defended itself by emphasizing COMPAS’s compliance with
the metric of predictive parity. Predictive parity in this context refers to the fact that two defendants labelled with a COMPAS high-risk classification committed similar rates of pretrial
crime. Recent studies have demonstrated the impossibility of achieving both statistical parity
and predictive parity in an algorithmic system, resulting in most pretrial algorithms complying
only with the metric of predictive parity, see William Dieterich et al., COMPAS Risk Scales:
Demonstrating Accuracy Equity and Predictive Parity, NORTHPOINTE (2016), https://go.volarisgroup.com/rs/430-MBX-989/images/ProPublica_Commentary_Final_070616.pdf
[http://perma.cc/L7VU-T4BT]. See also Mayson, Bias, supra note 3, at 2234–36; Deborah Hellman, Measuring Algorithmic Fairness, 106 Va. L. Rev. 811, 816–20 (forthcoming 2020.
113 Mayson, Bias, supra note 3, at 2234.
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PAS did not explicitly take racial information into account in its risk calculation. Importantly, COMPAS is not alone. Since most risk assessment algorithms use these factors, these systems will unfairly and disproportionally
falsely identify Black defendants as at a high risk for pretrial crime in comparison to White defendants.
2.

Exclusive use of Carceral Inputs

Another input selection issue involves what this Article terms the exclusive utilization of carceral inputs, which refers to inputs that ostensibly correspond with the risks that a defendant’s release poses to public safety.114 Nearly
all currently employed algorithms are constructed to only account for the presence or absence of risk factors that correlate with a defendant’s nonappearance
at trial or arrest for pretrial crime. These algorithms are not designed to factor
in the harms associated with pretrial detention.
The exclusive reliance on carceral inputs results in these systems obscuring
and ignoring the harms associated with a defendant’s pretrial detention. This
is a problem, because, as Crystal Yang has noted, there are individual, familial,
and communal harms associated with pretrial detention. Individually, pretrial
detention can be a physically, emotionally, and mentally traumatizing event.115
This traumatization can induce defendants to plead guilty despite innocence.116
On the familial side, pretrial incarceration could lead to parental separation or
even the loss of parental rights as the children of incarcerated pretrial detainees
are transferred into the foster care system.117 Socially, the pretrial system overextends social kinship networks, as those left behind are forced to expend time
and limited resources assuming the financial and caregiving obligations of
those who are incarcerated.118 For the community that the defendant is part
of,119 pretrial detention endangers that community’s safety by destabilizing that
Shima Baradaran Baughman, Costs of Pretrial Detention, 97 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 5–6 (2017) (stating
that “[d]etainees are often victims of humiliation, rape, and other violent acts while incarcerated, and they also suffer added anxiety, stress, and a lower quality of life as a result.”).
115 Id.
116 Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 42, at 22 (“The increase in convictions [following pretrial
detention] is primarily an increase in guilty pleas among defendants who otherwise would have
had their charges dropped. The plea-inducing effect of detention undermines the legitimacy
of the criminal justice system itself—especially if some of those convicted are innocent.”).
117 Dorothy E. Roberts, Prison, Foster Care, and the Systemic Punishment of Black Mothers, 59 UCLA
L. Rev. 1474, 1482 (2012).
118 The large-scale incarceration of Black fathers disrupts family life and places an insurmountable burden on Black women caregivers, who struggle to take up the financial and social void
that the incarcerated person leaves behind; see id. See generally Kimberle W. Crenshaw, From
Private Violence to Mass Incarceration: Thinking Intersectionally About Women, Race, and Social Control,
59 UCLA L. REV. 1418 (2012).
119 Jocelyn Simonson, The Place Of “The People” In Criminal Procedure, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 249,
250-60 (2019) (discussing how the criminal legal system promotes the false notion that the
114
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defendant and reducing their prospect for financial and social reintegration
following their detention.120 The sole inclusion of carceral inputs operates to
maintain the negative externalities of incarceration on these low income racially marginalized communities. By disregarding the private and social costs
that pretrial incarceration inflicts, the algorithmic construction process has led
to the creation of carceral pretrial algorithms that are more likely to harm rather than to facilitate the safety of these communities.
3.

Failure to utilize communal knowledge

The fact that the algorithmic construction process can produce algorithmic systems that both ignore and reify racial inequities in the pretrial process
is a troubling paradox:121 these algorithms reproduce the inequities that their
employment is intended to counteract. On the one hand, the problem flows
from the nature of risk assessment itself. As Sandra Mayson explains, risk assessment operates on the theory that the past will replicate itself in the future. 122
If the past is racially disparate, then the future predictions of risk by pretrial
algorithms will also be racially disparate.123
On the other hand, the problem hinges on the failure to utilize communal
information sources about the relationship between risk, crime, and the attributes of crime committers in the algorithmic construction process. To date, developers have exclusively relied on the data produced by criminal legal institutions to inform decisions around which factors should be included in algorithmic systems. Yet, data from criminal legal institutions are notoriously incomplete, since most crimes are not reported124 and crime statistics are infected
with racially biased policing practices.125 The exclusive reliance on the data produced by criminal legal institutions has facilitated the prevalence of arrests and
convictions as algorithmic factors, even though these factors are not reliable
proxies for a defendant’s dangerousness, particularly as it pertains to members

defendant’s interest in pretrial release is in opposition to the community’s interest in public
safety).
120 Ifeoma Ajunwa & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Combating Discrimination Against the Formerly Incarcerated in the Labor Market, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1385 (2018) (discussing the barriers that
conviction impose on formerly incarcerated people in the labor market).
121 Ajunwa, supra note 69.
122 Mayson, Bias, supra note 3, at 2234.
123 Id. at 2251. (“Any form of prediction that relies on data about the past will produce racial
disparity if the past data shows the event that we aspire to predict—the target variable—occurring with unequal frequency across racial groups.”).
124 Andrew G. Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1109, 1146 (2017).
125 Mayson, Bias, supra note 3, at 2264.
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of racially marginalized communities.126 This is because for those communities,
arrests and convictions are more likely to be wrongfully produced and do not
necessarily correspond with factual guilt or dangerousness.127 The net effect is
that pretrial algorithms do not benefit from communal knowledge128 and instead are constructed with racially disparate and carceral information that resultingly renders these systems less capable of predicting racially marginalized
defendants’ pretrial risk. The consequence is that pretrial algorithms of today
consist of carceral and racially disparate inputs that operate to reproduce existing racial disparities that serve largely to reflect the racial inequities existing
in the dispensing of arrests and convictions within the criminal legal system.
B.

Exclusion from Pretrial Governance

Communal exclusion from pretrial algorithmic governance operates to reproduce the group’s marginalization in pretrial governance. It is true that before the deployment of pretrial algorithms, these communities were democratically excluded from full participation in the creation, implementation, and
oversight of pretrial law, policy, and practices. As Jocelyn Simonson’s work
has demonstrated, this democratic exclusion results from their political disempowerment.129 Unlike their wealthier and Whiter counterparts, members of
these historically marginalized communities have diminished electoral power
to vote for bail judges and legislators who reflect their communal preferences
around pretrial justice.130 For this reason, pretrial legislation, policy, and practice are responsive to the preferences of socio-economically powerful citizens,
who have the financial resources to influence the appointment and direct election of bail judges who share their background and views around the pretrial
system. More importantly, these financial resources enable powerful groups to
build, as Sabeel Rahman notes, an “ecosystem of lobbying, advocacy, and
model legislation”131 that impacts pretrial law, policy, and practice. For the
above reasons, most impacted communities have diminished political power
to render those in charge of pretrial governance accountable to their needs and
interests.

Berk, supra note 78, at 185. (finding that found that the use of past misdemeanor arrests
and the age of an offender’s earliest arrest were not reliable predictors of future offending for
Black juvenile defendants as compared to White juvenile defendants)
127 See, e.g., Roberts, Arrests, supra note 105; Roberts, Convictions, supra note 105.
128 I discuss the concept of communal knowledge in Ngozi Okidegbe, Discredited Data (work
in progress) (on file with author).
129 Jocelyn Simonson, The Place of The People in Criminal Procedure, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 274–
75 (2019); Simonson, supra note 17.
130 Simonson, supra note 23.
131 K. Sabeel Rahman, Policymaking as Power-Building, 27 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 315, 318 (2018)
(Discussing this problem in the administrative context).
126
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One effect of these communities’ political powerlessness relates to their
overincarceration in the pretrial system. As Samuel Wiseman’s work has
demonstrated, the current political and social climate incentivizes bail judges
to over-detain defendants awaiting trial.132 The reason being that bail judges
experience minimal consequences for detaining a low risk defendant, yet face
intense public backlash for the release of a defendant who ultimately commits
another crime or flees the jurisdiction.133 For bail judges, the cost of a release
that is perceived as erroneous might mean the loss of their judgeship.134 In
contrast, no individual judge faces a real prospect of impeachment or loss of
an election from overincarceration practices, since members from those communities lack the political power to render these judges democratically accountable to them. The state of affairs has meant that decisions around pretrial
release, detention, and surveillance are rarely in line with the very communities
that stand to be harmed by large-scale pretrial incarceration.135
Though pretrial algorithms did not inaugurate the democratic exclusion
that these communities traditionally face within pretrial governance, the utilization of these tools operates to reinforce it. This is because communities, due
to their exclusion from algorithmic governance, are unable either to affect the
algorithm’s construction or to viably challenge its results in a pretrial hearing.
To understand this problem, it is important to consider bottom-up and confrontational practices136 that have emerged in recent years to contest overincarceration in the pretrial context. One important practice has been the rise of
community bail funds, which contest overincarceration practices within the
pretrial system by systematically bailing out low income and low risk defendants, whose release enhances community safety.137 As Jocelyn Simonson has
noted, these communal bail funds reflect and inject a communal voice about
Wiseman, supra note 56.
For more information on this point: see RACHEL E. BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS:
BREAKING THE CYCLE OF MASS INCARCERATION (2019).
134 Wiseman, supra note 56, at 422.
135 Id.
136 Amna A. Akbar, Law's Exposure: The Movement And Legal Academy, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 352,
364-65 (2015) (“[social movements] make clear that ordinary channels of accountability cannot
be relied upon . . . . Contrary to traditional litigation and voting disconnected from a larger
campaign, the movement’s approaches are confrontational with t turn away together to come
back another day stronger.”).
137 There are a number of community bail organizations actively bailing out low income defendants, such as: One Community, Ways To Support the Black Community and Combat Racism:
Black People's Justice Fund, ONE COMMUNITY, (last viewed Jan. 8, 2021), https://www.onecommunity.co/ways-to-support-the-black-community-and-combat-racism
[https://perma.cc/RGZ6-M26M]; NorCal Resist Activist BAIL & ICE Bond Fund, NORCAL RESIST, https://actionnetwork.org/fundraising/ncrbailfund/ [https://perma.cc/MW3X-98YN]; Chi.
Comm. Bond Fund, Our Mission, CHI. COMM. BOND FUND, https://www.chicagobond.org/
[https://perma.cc/S5CJ-PHHU].
132
133
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pretrial release practices.138 By bailing out defendants, these community bail
funds show that at least one segment of the community contests the bail
judge’s assessment that the defendant’s safe release must hinge on the payment
of an unaffordable bail amount. These bottom-up practices have been an important disruptive practice that has rendered visible the disconnect between
the pretrial system’s operation and the views and values of most impacted
communities.139
Despite their efficacy, such bottom-up practices are ineffective at contesting and impacting pretrial interventions that are shaped by pretrial algorithms.
This is because many jurisdictions that utilize pretrial algorithms have also
eliminated the practice of cash bail, conditioning decisions around release, detention, and surveillance instead on a defendant’s perceived riskiness.140 Without the mechanism of cash bail, decisions around pretrial detention cannot be
influenced or counteracted by communal practices. Community bail funds, for
example, are powerless to facilitate the release of a defendant, whose detention
is partially conditioned on a risk prediction, and not cash bail. To be clear, the
aim of recognizing this problem is not to suggest a preference for cash bail.
Cash bail is a socio-economic and racially disparate practice that has itself been
a major contributor to the crisis of racialized pretrial incarceration. Rather, the
point is that pretrial algorithmic governance means the foreclosure of avenues
for disruptive and influential communal participation in pretrial governance.
This consequence has even pushed a few community groups to seek inclusion
in pretrial algorithmic governance, despite their repudiation of the algorithm
project.141 Given this, these communities’ exclusion from pretrial algorithmic
governance serves to reinforce their marginalization in the crafting and implementation of the pretrial laws and policies that have promoted their overincarceration – therein hampering current efforts to reform or to dismantle and to

Simonson, supra note 55, at 591 (“Community bail funds provide to the public real-life
examples of indigent defendants returning to court without having undermined public safety,
despite an expert judicial determination that personal money was needed to prevent flight and
mayhem.”).
139 It is important to note these practices are disruptive but also can unintentionally operate to
legitimate the system: Id. at 631. (“On the one hand, one might object to com-munity bail
funds—especially when they resemble bail nullification—as a subversion of the rule of law;
and on the other hand, one might worry that a belief in the power of community bail funds
risks legitimizing an unfair procedural scheme.”).
140 Diana Dabruzzo, New Jersey Set Out to Reform Its Cash Bail System. Now, the Results are In.,
ARNOLD VENTURES, Nov. 14, 2019, https://www.arnoldventures.org/stories/new-jerseyset-out-to-reform-its-cash-bail-system-now-the-results-are-in/[https://perma.cc/7QBCGRHS].
141 LEADERSHIP CONF. EDUC. FUND, supra note 9 (discussing lack of community consultation
around algorithmic construction).
138
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rebuild the pretrial system to be in line with communal values and viewpoints.
142

C.

Exclusion from Full Participation in a Democratic Society

Both communal exclusion from algorithmic construction and this exclusion’s
reinforcement of this group’s marginalization within pretrial governance produce a system primed to uphold the racial status quo with no effective avenue
for communal resistance. This facilitation of the status quo leads to a third
layer of the input problem which is: pretrial algorithmic governance’s exacerbation of the democratic harms that the criminal legal system already enacts
on these marginalized communities. A number of scholars, such as Dorothy
Roberts, Janet Moore, Jocelyn Simonson, and others, have argued that the
criminal legal system enacts democratic harms on racially marginalized communities by diluting their political, economic, and social power to the point of
denying them full participation in our democracy.143 By its exclusion of these
communities, pretrial algorithmic governance, alongside other criminal laws
and practices, functions as a site that reproduces and contributes to the democratic harms experienced by these communities, facilitating a racialized system.144
On this basis, the input problem sets pretrial algorithmic governance up to
reproduce the pretrial system’s political, economic, and social costs on the
most-impacted communities. This is concerning since these costs of the pretrial system disentitle these communities from exercising their rights to full
citizenship.145 The pretrial system of detention adversely affects the democratic
participation of these communities. On account of the plea-inducing impact
of pretrial incarceration, many exit the system with a criminal record that temporarily or permanently restricts their right to vote.146 These restrictions dilute
these communities’ political power to orient the pretrial system away from
policies that promote the over-incarceration of their community members.

See infra Part II.C.
Janet Moore, Democracy Enhancement in Criminal Law and Procedure, 3 UTAH L. REV. 543
(2014); Roberts, supra note 22, at 1605; Simonson, supra note 23; Monica C. Bell, Anti-segregation
Policing, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651 (2020). Zina Makar, Detention, Disenfranchisement, and Doctrinal
Integration, (work in progress) (manuscript on file with the author) (exploring how pretrial detention de facto stripes detainees’ of their right to vote.)
144 Simonson, supra note 23, at 17.
145 Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1277 (2004) (contending that incarceration generally “has become a systemic aspect of community members’ family affairs, economic prospects, political
engagement, social norms, and childhood expectations for the future.”).
146 See Ekow N. Yankah, Good Guys and Bad Guys: Punishing Character, Equality and the Irrelevance
of Moral Character to Criminal Punishment, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1019, 1030–31 (2004).
142
143
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Economically, pretrial incarceration strains wealth production as financial, material, and intellectual resources are diverted to the jail system.147 Alongside
post-conviction incarceration, pretrial incarceration operates as a redistribution of wealth from the poor to the state, extracting the limited resources of
low income communities of color, which in turn disrupts intergenerational
wealth transfers and perpetuates the racial cycle of poverty.148 Socially, the pretrial system overextends social kinship networks, as those left behind are
forced to expend time and limited resources assuming the financial and caregiving obligations of those who are incarcerated.149 The combination of these
consequences creates a racial, gendered, and class geography of disrupted social kinship networks, economic disenfranchisement, and political estrangement that operates to deny members of low income, Black communities full
citizenship, all of which the current iteration of pretrial algorithmic governance
contributes to and entrenches.
III.

SOLVING THE INPUT PROBLEM

Part II sets out the particular harms that the input problem imposes on
members of low-income racialized communities. In this Part, this Article discusses the most promising redress to the input problem: shifting power over
pretrial algorithmic governance to members of most impacted communities.
To do this, it starts by discussing the growing consensus around the need for
public input into algorithmic design. It then demonstrates the limitations associated with approaches to the input problem that do not shift power over
algorithmic governance to these communities. Using the example of Pennsylvania, which held a series of public hearings around its decision to employ a
sentencing algorithm, it contends that such approaches, though politically palatable and implementable, largely maintain the input problem, whilst presenting the risk that communal participation will be misconstrued as communal
approval. It then sets out the dimensions of the Article’s power-shifting model.
The promise and anticipated objections to this power-shifting model are discussed in detail in Parts IV and Part V.
A.

Consensus around public participation

Before discussing ways to resolve the input problem, it is necessary to
note the growing consensus around the importance of public participation in

Roberts, supra note 145, at 1282.
Id.
149 The large-scale incarceration of Black fathers disrupts family life and places an insurmountable burden on Black women caregivers, who struggle to take up the financial and social void
that the incarcerated person leaves behind; see Roberts, supra note 116; See generally Crenshaw,
supra note 117; Ekow N. Yankah, Punishing the Polity: How Criminal Justice Should Account for Mass
Incarceration, RES PHILOSOPHICA 185 (2020) (“The incarceration of large number from particular communities undermines the fabric that sustains essential community functions.”).
147
148
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algorithmic governance. While algorithmic governance was in its infancy, there
was a contentious debate about the necessity of public input.150 However, as
algorithmic systems and structures have mushroomed in recent years, a growing consensus about the importance of public participation in algorithmic governance has emerged.151 It has become increasingly apparent that the design
and deployment of algorithmic systems could benefit from public feedback,
especially since these systems are not created in a political or social vacuum.152
Constructing, implementing, and overseeing any algorithmic system requires
technocrats to make highly discretionary and value laden decisions that shape
how law and public policy are applied. For instance, as Jessica Eaglin has noted
in the context of sentencing algorithms, decisions around risk thresholds are
unavoidably normative, because it is impossible to determine the cutoff between different risk thresholds without confronting an unavoidable value judgment about the level of risk that is socially acceptable.153 These realities have
substantially undermined the notion that algorithmic systems are neutral, impartial, or apolitical, or should be devoid of public input.154At the same time,
concerns around algorithmic accountability have bolstered ongoing support
Some claimed that soliciting public input might undermine the promising features of algorithmic governance, namely its objectivity and insulation from the arbitrariness and bias of
human decision making. Since members of the public lack technical and policy expertise, giving credence to their viewpoint risked diluting the accuracy and efficiency of algorithmic systems whilst also delegitimizing the entire algorithmic project. Moreover, supporters of this
viewpoint have tended to contest the idea that public participation in algorithmic governance
is a precondition for achieving algorithmic accountability and legitimate.
151 New York City has developed a task force highlighting the importance of public participation in algorithmic governance: See, e.g., N.Y., NEW YORK CITY AUTOMATED DECISION SYSTEMS TASK FORCE REPORT, (Nov. 2019), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/adstaskforce/downloads/pdf/ADS-Report-11192019.pdf (recommending the broadening of public discussions
on automated decision systems that New York agencies and offices use in the course of
providing public services). Also a few organizations have created partnerships between communities and state actors to facilitate public participation around technology: see N.Y.U., POLICING PROJECT, RESPONSIBLE USE OF POLICING TECHNOLOGY, https://www.policingproject.org/policing-tech-landing [https://perma.cc/V6XM-SWPD].
152 Ric Simmons, Big Data, Machine Judges, and the Legitimacy of the Criminal Justice System, 52 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1067, 1085-1086 (2018); John Logan Koepke & David G. Robinson, Danger
Ahead: Risk Assessment and the Future of Bail Reform, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1725, (2018); Ngozi
Okidegbe, When They Hear Us: Race, Algorithms and the Practice of Criminal Law, 29 KAN. J.L. &
PUB. Pol'y 329 (2020) (noting transparency as a key precondition for facilitating communal
participation in algorithmic governance); Eaglin, Constructing, supra note 3; Mailyn Fidler, Local
Police Surveillance And The Administrative Fourth Amendment, 36 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.
481 (2020) (advocating for local input in policing technologies).
153 Eaglin, Constructing, supra note 3.
154 See UMOJANOBLE, supra note 31, at 2 (discussing the problem that algorithmic systems are
not neutral and are designed with the sexist, racist, and classist ideas of its designers in the
context of algorithms designed in the search engine context); Sarah Valentine, Impoverished Algorithms: Misguided Governments, Flawed Technologies, and Social Control, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 364,
379 (2019) (advocating for public input in algorithmic governance).
150
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for public participation in algorithmic governance. The idea being that the legitimacy of algorithmic governance hinges on its ability to engage with and be
responsive to public input.155 For adherents of this view, algorithmic governance needs to afford the same types of participatory mechanisms that have
been integral to governmental processes, particularly in the administrative
realm.
B.

Limits of non-power-shifting approaches

As consensus coalesces around the importance of public input, a few jurisdictions have sought to mediate public participation in algorithmic governance. All these approaches have transpired under a participatory model of
communal involvement that revolves around the ex-post solicitation of public
input from a variety of stakeholders in forms ranging from stakeholder meetings156 to public hearings.157 This model of communal involvement takes inspiration from participatory processes utilized in the administrative sphere. As
Richard A. Bierschbach and Stephanos Bibas have explained, a cornerstone of
the administrative approach to communal participation is to allow “citizens
[to] communicate their information and their views, but the governmental decision-maker [has the] ultimate power to balance the various inputs and make
a final decision.”158
The problem with this approach is not communal exclusion. Rather, members from these communities or relevant community groups are often included
as stakeholders at these sessions. The issue with this approach is that the input
problem is largely maintained by design. Pennsylvania’s mediation of public
Requiring that the value laden decisions around algorithmic governance be subject to public
debate and scrutiny may force developers and other technocrats to justify their decisions
around algorithmic systems, promoting accountability: see David Freeman Engstrom and
Daniel E. Ho, Algorithmic Accountability in The Administrative State, 37 YALE J. ON REG. (2020)
(forthcoming).
156 PRANITA AMATYA ET. AL, BAIL REFORM IN CALIFORNIA, (2017), https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=835f283ae9fc-9c56-28bb-073a9bcb1dbf.
157 Stephanie Wykstra, Can Racial Bias Ever Be Removed From Criminal Justice Algorithms?, PACIFIC
STANDARD, Jul. 12, 2018, https://psmag.com/social-justice/removing-racial-bias-from-thealgorithm [https://perma.cc/4D4D-BF4D] (discussing the fact that the sentencing held public hearing around the use of a sentencing algorithm in Pennsylvania); NEW YORK CITY AUTOMATED DECISION SYSTEMS TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 151 (contending that the task
force held a number of meeting with stakeholders around the use of automated decisions in
the public sector). But see, Rashida Richardson, ed., “Confronting Black Boxes: A Shadow Report of the New York City Automated Decision System Task Force,” AI Now Institute, December 4, 2019, https://ainowinstitute.org/ads-shadowreport-2019.html (criticizing the small
number of stakeholders consulted by the New York City Automated Decision Systems Task
Force).
158 Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Notice-and-Comment Sentencing, 97 MINN. L. REV.
1, 21 (2012).
155
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participation with its sentencing algorithm is illustrative. In 2010, Pennsylvania
passed legislation requiring its Sentencing Commission (“Commission”) to develop a risk assessment instrument, as part of its strategy to reduce the state’s
incarcerated population.159 When resistance to this sentencing algorithm project gained momentum, the Commission held a series of public hearings to
solicit public feedback around the algorithm’s construction to quell concerns.160 The process included various stakeholders, including community
groups representing members from most impacted communities.
The effort was hailed by many as an exemplary approach to mediating
public participation in algorithmic governance.161 However, key features of this
participatory process locked in place the input problem and its ensuing consequences. First, the entire participatory process solicited ex-post input around
algorithmic governance. By situating public participation after the approval of
the use of algorithmic governance, most impacted communities were stripped
of the power to take up first order questions about the nature and value of
algorithmic governance itself in the sentencing context.162 Second, the process
placed exclusive control over the algorithm’s inputs within the hands of the
Commission.163 This left little room for members from most impacted communities to contest and to resist the use of inputs that would promote the
overincarceration of their community members and resultingly threatened
their community safety. For instance, though community organizing drove the
Commission to eventually abandon the use of past arrests as a factor in the
calculation of a risk score,164 the Commission did not remove other proxies,
such as past convictions, that would unfairly inflate the risk scores of Black

The instrument was intended to aid judges in identifying low risk offenders for alternative
sentencing programs. See 42 PA. CONST. STAT. § 2154.7 (2019).
160 Stephanie Wykstra, Just How Transparent Can a Criminal Justice Algorithm Be?, SLATE, July 3,
2020, https://slate.com/technology/2018/07/pennsylvania-commission-on-sentencing-istrying-to-make-its-algorithm-transparent.html [https://perma.cc/V9HN-MDQ3].
161 Wykstra, supra note 158.
162 Simonson, supra note 23, at 20.
163 This problem is only compounded by the vulnerability of institutional stakeholders to capture. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture through Institutional Design, 89
TEXAS L. REV. 15, 21 n.23 (2010) (describing capture as undue “responsiveness to the desires
of the industry or groups being regulated.”).
164 Asli Bashir, Pennsylvania’s Misguided Sentencing Risk-Assessment Reform, THE REGULATORY
REVIEW, Nov 5, 2020, https://www.theregreview.org/2020/11/05/bashir-pennsylvania-misguided-sentencing-risk-assessment-reform/ It is important to note the fact that discriminatory
effects of including of past arrests as a factor in the algorithm was recognized by a few of the
commissioners. For instance, Rachel Lopez problematizes and advocated to remove the use
of arrests as an algorithmic factor during several commission meeting. See e.g. PA. COMM'N.
ON SENT'G, COMMISSION MEETING MINUTES: MARCH 3, 2016 5-7 (2016),
http://pcs.la.psu.edu/about-the-commission/meetings/meeting-minutes/prioryears/2016/march-2016/view
159
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offenders.165 Since the Commission had sole control and decision-making
power over the risk assessment tool, it had discretion to determine which recommendations it would take on. This left the participatory process with no
mechanism to prioritize the feedback of Black Pennsylvanians, despite the fact
that their disproportionate rate of incarceration, which is approximately nine
times that of their White counterparts, renders them uniquely vulnerable to
the sentencing algorithm’s outputs.166 These dynamics “re-inscribed rather
than dismantle[ed] existing power imbalances[,]”167enabling the Commission
to adopt the sentencing algorithm positioned to reproduce existing racial disparities.168 Yet, disturbingly, despite the lack of communal control over the
algorithm’s purpose and design, the sentencing algorithm might be able to
benefit from the illusion that construction was the product of community consultation, which in turn will facilitate its legitimation in the state.
The Pennsylvania experience illustrates the limits of redressing the input
problem by merely facilitating greater public participation in algorithmic governance. By not facilitating the empowerment of members from most impacted communities, such processes will inevitably re-inscribe existing power
imbalances that operate to undermine efforts by these communities to resist
or influence algorithmic governance. This state of affairs begs the question of
whether any efforts short of shifting power over algorithmic governance could
correct the input problem. For the reasons discussed below, this Article suggests that while such efforts can ameliorate the first layer of the input problem

Elizabeth Hardison, After Nearly A Decade, Pa. Sentencing Commission Adopts Risk Assessment
Tool Over Objections of Critics, PA. CAPITAL-STAR, Sept. 5, 2019, https://www.penncapitalstar.com/criminal-justice/after-nearly-a-decade-pa-sentencing-commission-adopts-risk-assessment-tool-over-objections-of-critics/ [https://perma.cc/2765-ST9H].
166 See Ashley Nellis, The Color of Justice: Racial and Ethnic Disparity in State Prisons, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, June 2016, at 5.
167 Simonson, supra note 17, at 1610; See also IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY (2000).
168 This problem was brought to the commission’s attention by a 2019 independent assessment
by a Carnegie Mellon University research team. That report recommended that the sentencing
algorithm’s use be limited to low risk defendants, after concluding that the sentencing algorithm only accurately identified high risk defendants 48% of the time and was particularly
inaccurate in relation to Black defendants. David Mitre Becerril et al., Validation and Assessment
of Pennsylvania’s Risk Assessment Instrument, HEINZ COLLEGE SYSTEM SYNTHESIS PROJECT, 36,
51–52 (2019). It should also be noted that the Commission made small alterations to the sentencing algorithm in response to the Carnegie Mellon report, but rejected the recommendation
to use the tool for low risk offenders. See PA. COMMISSION ON SENTENCING, RISK ASSESSMENT UPDATE: STAFF’S RESPONSE TO CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY’S EXTERNAL REVIEW COMMISSION QUARTERLY MEETING: JUNE 13, 2019, http://pcs.la.psu.edu/guidelines/sentence-risk-assessment-instrument/
sentence-risk-assessment-research-archives/commission-response-to-external-review/view. [https://perma.cc/5HYH-U84G].
165
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by facilitating communal involvement in algorithmic construction, these efforts are unable to ameliorate the latter two layers of the input problem, since
they reproduce it.
To show this, the following section will consider a series of approaches
that would center the participation of most impacted communities without
endowing them with decision-making power. This kind of participation would
allow members from these communities to lodge their views about algorithmic
governance but would not endow this community with a veto regarding if and
on what basis such governance would be pursued in the pretrial system.
1.

Focus Groups

The first option would mean holding focus groups comprised of members
from communities most impacted by incarceration. One possibility in this vein
would be for private companies to hold such a focus group as a precondition
to designing an algorithm for pretrial use. Procurement contracts could require
such a process. Beyond the recruitment and sampling bias associated with the
use of focus groups,169 the main problem is that the approach endows private
companies with the ultimate control and decision-making power over the algorithmic formula. Companies – rather than members from these communities – would retain power to determine which input to incorporate or disregard,
leaving intact the two latter layers of the input problem. To compound this
issue, the focus group process can operate to legitimatize the end algorithmic
product under the guise of community approval, even if all or most of the
communal input was disregarded. For this reason, this option would not fix
the input problem.
2.

Public Hearings

The second option would require the holding of public hearings solely designed to obtain input from most impacted communities. This would differ
from Pennsylvania’s approach, since it would prioritize the feedback of most
impacted communities rather than position most impacted communities as
merely one among many relevant stakeholders.170 Two problems arise with this
approach. One is the exacerbation of power imbalances that already exist in
these communities. Given that those attending these hearings tend not to receive financial compensation or reimbursement, participation would likely be
skewed towards the most financially stable and educated members in these
communities to the detriment of the most marginalized members. Further-

169

See generally David L Morgan, Why Things (Sometimes) Go Wrong in Focus Groups, 5 QUALITA-

TIVE HEALTH RESEARCH 516, 516-523 (1995).

This dynamic risk reproducing the Pennsylvania experience: see Part X, Section X, 4 for
more information.
170
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more, like the focus group model, this option neither facilitates the incorporation of these communities’ views into the algorithm nor would it afford them
a mechanism to resist the use of the algorithm itself. Both issues mean that
adopting this option would entrench the latter two layers of the input problem.
3.

Appointed Citizen Boards

The third option would be to create appointed citizen boards, where community members could serve and provide input to the ultimate designer of the
algorithm. To create such a board, one might borrow from the policing context, which has seen a rise in informal advisory policing citizen boards that
provide input on the practices and policies of police forces.171 A major flaw
with this approach is that there would be no mechanism to contest the use of
the algorithm or to ensure their communal viewpoints around the algorithm’s
use and purpose are taken on. As such, this approach risks regulating communal feedback to ex-post decisions around algorithmic adoption, construction,
and oversight, which like Pennsylvania’s approach, strips communities of involvement in first order questions about the algorithm’s design, purpose, and
value.
These shortcomings illustrate how non-power-shifting approaches maintain key consequences of the input problem. Even with these shortcomings,
the benefits of the participatory approach cannot be ignored. This model is
able to counteract the first layer of the input problem. One promising feature
of that counteraction is that this model could enable members of oppressed
communities to raise their viewpoints about algorithmic governance. Such
might be empowering. It might also afford a degree of accountability to these
communities by incentivizing decision-makers to justify their algorithmic system’s inputs and outputs.172 This process might influence decision-makers to
make improvements to the algorithmic systems used along the lines that these
communities proffered, potentially decreasing these communities’ experience
of pretrial detention. Additionally, this model is politically palatable. If algorithmic governance is inevitable, it may be worth it to seek approaches that
partially redress the input problem, especially if more radical approaches to
challenging and redressing racialized pretrial incarceration, such as full abolition remain politically infeasible and the large-scale reduction of pretrial detention, such as provided for in the New York Bail Reform Law, does not guard

One example is the Community Relations Bureau’s Community Response Squad that advises the Phoenix police force: see https://www.phoenix.gov/police/neighborhood-resources/citizen-advisory-boards; To see criticisms of community police models; see Joseph
Rukus, Mildred E. Warner & Xue Zhang, Community Policing: Least Effective Where Need Is Greatest, 64(14) CRIME & DELINQUENCY 1858-1881 (2018).
172 Bierschbach et al., supra note 159, at 23 (discussing how public input in the administrative
arena improves accountability by “by obligating agencies to justify their actions publicly, ensuring that they are ‘relatively informed and responsive to public needs.’”).
171
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against the continued use of risk assessment tools.173 On this basis, counterintuitively, seeking at least inclusion in algorithmic governance, even if it is not
controll, might serve to facilitate racial justice alterations to the formulas behind the algorithms implicated in the overincarceration of racially marginalized
defendants. Given these potential benefits, it is conceded that the participatory
model is preferable to the status quo.
Yet, the major downside of the participatory model is that it largely leaves
intact the other ensuing consequences of the input problem which concern:
pretrial governance’s contribution to the democratic exclusion experienced by
racially marginalized communities both within and outside of pretrial governance. The main reason for this result is that the participatory model affords no
lever for facilitating the incorporation of the communal input solicited. Decision-makers are free to reject or incorporate communal feedback as they wish,
leaving these marginalized communities without an avenue to reform or dismantle the pretrial algorithms that are adversely affecting their daily lives.
Moreover, this model risks skewing outcomes towards the preferences of the
most powerful stakeholders, because as K. Sabeel Rahman and Jocelyn Simonson notes, “some constituencies already possess greater capacity for power and
influence” than others.174 Any process for mediating public input that is not
specifically designed to counteract this operation of privilege guarantees amplifying the voices of members from whiter and wealthier communities whilst
muting the voices of less privileged groups. For this reason, when applied to
the context of pretrial algorithmic governance, the participatory model risks
marginalizing or alienating members in most impacted communities that are
opposed to all or key aspects of the algorithm project. The materialization of
either outcome means the reproduction and maintenance of a large swath of
the input problem. Given this, power-shifting – which this Article discusses in
the next section remains - the most viable approach to redressing the input
problem but poses a different series of concerns, which are discussed at Part
V.
C.

Power-Shifting Approach

The power-shifting approach is one that would shift power over all or at
least key aspects of pretrial algorithmic governance to most impacted communities. It is connected to a particular conceptualization of democratic participation175 that has been theorized and advocated for in criminal law scholarship
FY 2020 New York State Executive Budget, supra 41, at 182.
Rahman et al., supra note 29, at 689.
175 CHANTAL L MOUFEE, AGNOSTICS: THINKING THE WORLD POLITICALLY 81 (2013)
(“Conflict in liberal democratic societies cannot and should not be eradicated, since the specificity of pluralistic democracy is precisely the recognition and legitimation of conflict. What
liberal democratic politics requires is that the others are not seen as enemies to be destroyed,
but as adversaries whose ideas might be fought, even fiercely, but whose right to defend those
173
174
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and administrative scholarship most recently by Jocelyn Simonson and K. Sabeel Rahman.176 Its central contention is that substantive or procedural policies
alone cannot ameliorate or dismantle racial and socio-economic inequities unless those policies attend to the power imbalance partially responsible for these
inequities.177 From this starting point, it holds that attending to power means
shifting the allocation of power within institutional structures toward the most
marginalized members of society, endowing them with direct power to “influence policy outcomes and control the distribution of state resources.”178 This
shift in power aims to provide mechanisms to promote the democratic participation of vulnerable groups that have traditionally been denied a share of decision making power.179
The focus on redistribution of power is what differentiates this model
from the participatory model of communal involvement. It recognizes that
inclusion in governing structures without attending to the allocation of power
cannot materially reform or dismantle the status quo. Rather, such inclusion
serves only to reproduce and legitimate racialized systems that maintain the
subordination of oppressed communities.180 For this reason, in contrast to the
participatory approach, the power-shifting model specifically seeks to foster
the participation of communities most impacted by the carceral state. In so
seeking, its design aims to counteract the marginalization that these communities face within governing structures and within society by centering these
communities.
1. Potential Power-Shifting Scenarios
This section sets out one scenario in which a power-shifting model of
communal involvement could be actualized in pretrial algorithmic governance:
bail commissions at the state and federal levels consisting of members from
low income racially marginalized communities with the principal task of determining if and on what basis pretrial algorithms are used in the pretrial system.
The scenario is premised on the creation of a new institutional structure. The

ideas is not to be questioned. To put it another way, what is important is that conflict does
not take the form of an ‘antagonism’ (struggle between enemies) but the form of ‘agonism’(struggle between adversaries).”).
176 Rahman et al., supra note 29; Rahman, Power-Building, supra note 128; Simonson, supra note
126; I. Bennett Capers, Criminal Procedure And The Good Citizen, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 653 (2018).
177 MOUFEE, supra note 174, at 81.
178 See Rahman et al., supra note 29, at 692.
179 Id. at 688-691.
180 Simonson, supra note 23 (contending that layers of democratic exclusion in the criminal
legal system have facilitated the “reproducing and legitimizing an unequal and racialized system
of justice.”).
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reason being that such a structure provides the most promising avenue for
effective power over pretrial algorithmic governance.
For this proposed institutional structure to have a prospect of powershifting, two conditions must be met: (1) the endowment of decision-making
power to most impacted communities and (2) representation of most impacted
communities on the commission.181
a.
Decision-making Power
Decision-making power must be exercisable by most impacted communities. This level of control is on a continuum, ranging from exclusive non-reviewable control to only control over key aspects of the adoption, implementation, and oversight of pretrial algorithms. At the very least, power-shifting
requires communities to have a mechanism to mandate the incorporation of
their viewpoints and values into algorithmic governance. Having a mechanism
means having control over the algorithm. Merely allowing communal representatives to participate or provide input around algorithmic governance is insufficient. Within the spectrum, one vision of power-shifting could be a commission consisting exclusively of members from most impacted communities
tasked with administrating, implementing, and overseeing pretrial algorithms,
assuming that body decides to pursue pretrial algorithmic governance. Under
that vision, technocrats, such as independent data scientists, developers, and
policymakers, may or may not have a role to play on the commission. Any role
that they may have would be subject to communal approval. On the other side
of the spectrum, however, another vision would be a commission consisting
of technocrats and community representatives with the primary task of determining if and how pretrial algorithmic governance operates in the jurisdiction.
Under this vision, community representatives would only have veto power
over key aspects of pretrial algorithmic governance that would have out-sized
effects on their community’s safety. For example, community representatives
could have a veto power over the adoption of pretrial algorithmic governance
in the first instance and the utilization of any input within the pretrial algorithm
that would increase the use of pretrial incarceration. Other decisions around
pretrial algorithmic governance could be decided by a simple majority. This
latter vision would lead to a blending of communal and technocratic expertise
that could facilitate the shaping of algorithmic governance to reflect communal
needs and values.
b.
Composition of Commission
Power-shifting requires a shift in who exercises decision-making power.
This means that representatives on the commission must be the Black people

181

Rahman et al., supra note 29, at 640-728.
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living in communities most affected by the use of pretrial algorithmic governance. Yet, one difficult issue in implementing this approach is defining eligibility. Who should be eligible for community representative positions? Should
eligibility be defined spatially, by self-identification, or by experience? The difficulty is compounded by the fact that every person whose body is ascribed
with the racial category of Black experiences the political, social, and economic
consequences of pretrial incarceration, even if indirectly.182 However, only
some will have the experience required to provide input approximating the
needs of the most impacted. For this reason, only those who live in low income
communities and have direct experience with incarceration must hold these
positions. This direct experience could take the form of: (1) having been formerly incarcerated, (2) being the immediate family member of a current or
formerly incarcerated person; or (3) being the direct victim of a crime. Three
reasons justify this limitation. First, these members tend to have the community expertise and community connections needed to represent this constituency’s interest on a commission. Second, allowing those without this experience threatens to magnify power imbalances within Black communities, as
those with more privileged identities obscure the viewpoints of the most marginalized. Third, because of the racial and economic segregation that persists
in American society,183 this prioritization of members from low income communities will also aid jurisdictions in determining the relevant community for
the purposes of the commission. 184
c.
Balancing Power Differentials if Technocrats Play a Role in the
Commission
If the power-shifting model adopted includes permanent positions for
technocrats, such as policymakers and developers, it would be important to
consider and redress the issue of power differentials. Power differentials between technocrat commissioners and community commissioners prompt the
risk of co-optation and the fear that marginalized community commissioners
might be particularly susceptible to being influenced and strong-armed by noncommunity commissioners. Promoting participation by non-commissioner

It is important to note that this would be a top-down approach to selecting commissioners.
Residential segregation remains high. See LAURA I. APPLEMAN, DEFENDING THE JURY:
CRIME, COMMUNITY, AND THE CONSTITUTION 78 (2015) (arguing that “[i]ndividual communities in the United States have tended to remain . . . . segregated according to race, ethnicity,
and class—therefore rendering localized communities more homogeneous.”). Also, it is possible to locate most impacted communities by focusing on most incarcerated zip codes: see,
e.g., Danielle Scruggs, Inside the “Most Incarcerated” Zip Code in the Country, TNR, Oct. 15, 2019,
https://newrepublic.com/article/155241/inside-most-incarcerated-zip-code-country
[https://perma.cc/F8XF-3NVR].
184 For non-Black or non-racially marginalized groups, the determination of “the community”
will be more difficult. A future work in progress will engage with this problem.
182
183
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community members (from most impacted communities) is one mode of offsetting this risk. Prior to determining the formula of the algorithm, the commission could seek input through stakeholder meetings, public hearings, or
community canvassing. These processes would serve to ensure that the commission operates in the interest of communities most impacted by incarceration and could also have the added benefit of ensuring legitimacy and accountability to the community.
IV.

THE POWER-SHIFTING MODEL’S POTENTIAL

If adopted in the pretrial algorithmic governance context, this model
could afford a potential resolution to the input problem, since it would subject
first order questions around pretrial algorithmic governance to communal consideration and authorization. At the same time, it could engender other benefits that are explored below.
A.

Improvement of Algorithmic Inputs

Assuming pretrial algorithmic governance is pursued, this model could improve the algorithms that are designed for the pretrial system, since it would
enable algorithmic systems to benefit from the knowledge of most impacted
communities. This potentiality engages with the critical race theory tradition,
185
which is a scholarly and activist movement that seeks to expose,186 challenge,
and change the way in which race is constructed,187 deployed, and operationalized to maintain existing power structures. Critical race theory supplies the
theoretical framework to understand and remedy how race and its intersection
with other subordinated statuses188 operate to privilege White identities over
negatively racially marginalized people. Bennett Capers has argued that Critical
race theory provides the vantage point for reckoning with how law constructs

It is difficult to define Critical Race Theory succinctly because of the various subgroups of
critical race theory that exist. However, it is unified by a set of common questions regarding
the power of race and racism within and outside of legal structures. See Jasmine B. Gonzales
Rose, Toward a Critical Race Theory of Evidence, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2243, 2248-49 (2016).
186 Though invented, race is ascribed onto individual bodies by a process of racialization, in
which certain physical features are imbued with social significance. Kendall Thomas, The
Eclipse of Reason: A Rhetorical Reading of Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1805, 1806 (1993) (“I
have suggested in some of my work in critical race theory that ‘race’ is a verb, that we are
‘raced’ through a constellation of practices that construct and control racial subjectivities.”).
187Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Policing the Boundaries of Whiteness: The Tragedy of Being out of Place from
Emmett Till to Trayvon Martin, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1113, 1183 (2017) (“Race is defined just as
much by stereotypes and the way one behaves in any particular moment and context as it is
by the way one looks, and by racially-associated ways of being such as how one dresses, how
one styles her hair, how one speaks, and how one votes.”).
188 Kimberle W. Crenshaw, Women of Color at the Center: Selections from the Third National Conference
on Women of Color and the Law. Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence
Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1244 (1991).
185
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race and racial meaning189 One of its tenets is that sites of knowledge production and power have traditionally privileged White identified groups, persons,
and values to the detriment of those ascribed non-White identities.190 To counter this problem, critical race theory promotes critical knowledge and embraces
racially marginalized people as knowledge producers, and emphasizes the importance of their experiential knowledge in naming and remedying racial injuries.191 Engaging with this concept, the power-shifting model promotes the
utilization of the experiential knowledge of those hailing from the communities that have been most ravaged by the carceral state in the construction, implementation, and oversight of pretrial algorithms, since these groups have
knowledge that could counteract and transform the racial hegemonies inherent
in the design of current algorithms. Because of their experience with the criminal legal system, members from low income racially marginalized communities
could utilize their unique expertise to develop algorithms designed to mitigate
the negative externalities associated with the imposition of incarceration on
low income communities of color. Working alone or alongside technocrats,
racially marginalized groups could name, disrupt, and dismantle assumptions
that propagate these systems’ reproduction of the racial inequities present in
the pretrial process.
The actualization of this potentiality could have a range of benefits. Assuming there is a risk component to the algorithms designed, these communities’ knowledge could improve this component’s predictive accuracy, since
these communities might have unique insights into the factors that increase
the likelihood of non-appearance and pretrial crime in their neighborhoods –
factors that may or may not be the same as factors that are currently utilized.
Moreover, communal knowledge could transform the algorithms from risk assessment algorithms to algorithms that provide a more holistic weighing of the
risks and harms associated with the defendant’s detention before trial. Having
experienced first-hand the negative externalities that overincarceration has had
I. Bennett Capers, Afrofuturism, Critical Race Theory, and Policing in the Year 2044, 94 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 1, 24 (2019).
190 Francisco Valdes, Outsider Jurisprudence, Critical Pedagogy and Social Justice Activism: Marking the
Stirrings of Critical Legal Education, 10 ASIAN L.J. 65, 70 (2003).
191 Maria C. Malagon, Lindsay Perez Huber & Veronica N. Velez, Our Experiences, Our Methods:
Using Grounded Theory to Inform a Critical Race Theory Methodology, 8 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 253,
257 (2009); EDWARD W. SAD, COVERING ISLAM 157 (1997) (describing the notion of antithetical knowledge as “kind of knowledge produced by people who quite consciously consider
themselves to be writing in opposition to the prevailing orthodoxy.”); RICHARD DELGADO &
JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 9 (2001) (“Coexisting in
somewhat uneasy tension with anti-essentialism, the voice-of-color thesis holds that because
of their different histories and experiences with oppression, [B]lack, Indian, Asian, and
Latino/a writers and thinkers may be able to communicate to their white counterparts matters
that the whites are unlikely to know. Minority status, in other words, brings with it a
presumed competence to speak about race and racism.”).
189
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on their communities, community representatives may reject risk-only algorithms in favor of ones that also consider or only consider harms that should
count against a defendant’s incarceration before trial. An example of such
harm-based factors could be the fact that a defendant is the primary caregiver
for a minor child. The dual consideration of harm and risk could be achieved
by having the algorithm perform two different assessments, one assessment
being a risk assessment and the other being a harm assessment. Because these
communities are adversely affected by the overincarceration of their community members as well as the release of “high risk” defendants before trial, their
control over pretrial algorithmic governance could facilitate the creation of algorithms that account for the full extent of the costs and benefits associated
with detaining a defendant before trial.
B.

Democratization of Pretrial Governance for Most Impacted Communities

The power-shifting model offers an opportunity to democratize pretrial
governance for most impacted communities. By endowing members from
most impacted communities with the control to resist pretrial algorithmic governance, this model enables communities to voice their opposition to the algorithm project and to an iteration of the pretrial system that is centered on
the incarceration of defendants without consideration of the harms that incarceration poses to their communities. Their rejection of this form of governance, if so done, could be read as their resistance to the current status quo and
a desire to prevent the lock-in of the current pretrial system.
At the same time, the power-shifting model could lead to the adoption of
an iteration of pretrial algorithmic governance that centers on most impacted
communities, which presents additional democratizing potential. Though traditionally conceptualized as an anti-democratic and technocratic space, this infrastructure controlled by these communities could be transformed into a site
that is democratic or even pluralistic, redressing the exclusion and political ostracization that these communities have experienced in pretrial governance.192
Under this scenario, such an iteration of pretrial algorithmic governance offers
a promising platform for low income racially marginalized people to democratically participate and influence the operation of a pretrial system that has
historically muted their voices and viewpoints. Because of how fundamental
these algorithms are becoming in the pretrial process and in bail policy, 193 this
model would afford members from these communities a path to render bail
judges and other bail officials accountable to them, and their notion of public
safety. Moreover, the model presents a “workaround” to the existing shortcomings of electoral politics that have tended to amplify powerful voices. This

Rahman, supra note 128; Eaglin, Constructing, supra note 3; Collins, supra note 3, at 66, 107–
10.
193 Roberts, supra note 22, at 608; see generally Simonson, supra note 17, at 1619-1620.
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would force the majority to hear and contend with the conditions that have
promoted the crisis of racialized pretrial incarceration as understood by those
inflicted by it. This power-shifting may or may not change outcomes, but it
still matters since it has the potential to promote the accountability and the
legitimacy of the pretrial system to communities that have traditionally been
estranged from it. Beyond pretrial incarceration, if replicated in other parts of
the criminal legal system, such a shift of power over algorithms may secure a
level of democratic engagement, on the part of most vulnerable members of
society, on a scale that has been unachievable to date.
V.

SOME DOUBTS

The power-shifting model could provide a complete redress of the input
problem yet resultingly would give rise to objections on the part of algorithm
reformers as well as community advocates. Using pretrial algorithms controlled by most impacted communities is not a politically palatable or easily
implementable solution, since its operationalization is subject to buy-in by
communities disproportionately impacted by incarceration, algorithm reformers, bail judges, and the public. The following section elaborates on the difficulties associated with achieving this buy-in, which itself is emblematic of the
tension between resolving the input problem on the one hand and the aims of
algorithmic governance on the other.
A.

Algorithm Reformers side

1. Dangers of Democratizing Criminal Law Objection
A major objection to the power-shifting model on the part of algorithm
reformers would be that the model places unwarranted faith in the power of
communities most impacted by incarceration to transform the pretrial algorithms and resultingly the pretrial system away from its carceral and racially
stratifying tendencies. A recent articulation of this objection has been authored
by John Rappaport. In his article, Some Doubts About Democratizing Criminal Justice,194 he doubts that decarceration goals can be achieved through increased lay
participation in the criminal legal process, instead warning that lay people hold
views that are too punitive, divisive and ill-informed to promote a fairer and
more lenient system.195 Democratization of criminal law, he contends, particularly if designed only to empower racially marginalized people risks further
flaring racial tensions and enlarging the carceral state. Rather than take this
chance, “democratizers” should advocate for evidence-based approaches

John Rappaport, Some Doubts About “Democratizing” Criminal Justice, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 711,
759 (2020).
195 Id. at 720.
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“consistent with democratic values” which would yield a fairer criminal legal
system.196
The Article’s articulation of the power-shifting model is not the form of
democratization that Rappaport’s critique is primarily directed at, since this
model aims only to democratize pretrial algorithmic governance and not the
entire pretrial system.197 Nonetheless, his critique remains applicable because
the power-shifting model necessitates increased democratic participation from
a segment of the population, most impacted communities, in the pretrial system. His critique is largely not fatal to the actualization of the model in theory.
It is true that members from the Black communities that have been most impacted by incarceration hold heterogeneous and sometimes irreconcilable
views about the criminal legal process, which will lead to potentially contentious debates around if and how an algorithm should operate in the pretrial
context.198 However, this is not unique to most impacted communities. Academics, developers and technocrats also hold divergent views. The very fact
that the pretrial algorithms that are currently in existence are exclusively risk
assessment algorithms represent a particular view about the purpose of the
pretrial system, a view that is not shared by all. For example, Crystal Yang has
suggested the development of a pretrial algorithm designed to perform an analysis that would inform bail judges about the advantages and disadvantages associated with incarcerating a defendant before trial.199 Her proposal neither
promotes community control nor community input, but it demonstrates that
the debates about the kinds of algorithms that should be employed in the pretrial system are not settled and will not necessarily be settled if pretrial algorithmic governance remains in the hands of technocrats. Moreover, there is no
guarantee that power-shifting would lead to the discontinuance of evidencebased practices or traditional experts, rather with the power-shifting model the
use of either would at most be subject to community discretion and at a minimum be combined with communal expertise.

Id. at 810.
Rappaport’s critique is aimed at those promoting democratic participation by local communities as the key to fixing the criminal legal system. See, e.g., Laura I. Appleman, Local Democracy, Community Adjudication, and Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1413 (2017).
198 Although there is not unanimity among Black adults regarding the state of the criminal legal
system, the majority hold the view that the criminal legal system is less fair to Blacks than to
Whites. See Juliana Menasce Horowitz, Anna Brown & Kiana Cox, Race in America 2019, PEW
RESEARCH CENTER, Apr. 9, 2019, at 11–12, https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2019/04/PewResearchCenter_RaceStudy_FINAL-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9RN8-EA4N].
199 Yang, supra note 45.
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Yet, Rappaport’s account remains important because it signals some of the
political backlash that may arise from shifting power to most impacted communities. This backlash will be particularly strong among algorithm reformers,
since the democratization proposed in this Article is in tension with their aims.
For many algorithm reformers, part of the appeal of this form of governance
stems from its potential to offset the penal populism that is partly responsible
for overincarcerating practices, particularly among elected judges.200 Under this
framing, it is supposed to offer a powerful counter majoritarian influence on
bail judges’ decision-making around the use of pretrial incarceration.201 Opening up control over pretrial algorithmic governance to most impacted communities threatens this aim by potentially transforming pretrial algorithmic systems into ones that are more “punitive” and if relied upon by bail judges might
increase the use of pretrial incarceration. Power-shifting does engender this
risk. And it does not suffice to counter this concern with the point that there
is no evidence that algorithms designed under the power-shifting model will
be more punitive. The perception alone threatens the actualization of the entire project.
At the same time, the power-shifting model provides no guarantee that the
pretrial algorithms derived under this model will be empirically derived or a
product of technocratic expertise, raising fears that the pretrial algorithms produced under this model will be viewed as illegitimate by algorithm reformers
and potentially society as a whole. On the flipside, the fact that this model
democratizes pretrial algorithmic governance exclusively for most impacted
communities could jeopardize its political palatability and democratic legitimacy in the eyes of wealthier and whiter communities, who might protest being subjected to an algorithm produced by a commission on which they have
no representation. These concerns are not hypothetical. Recent efforts to shift
control over policing to local communities, particularly low income Black and
Brown communities have been met with White backlash.202 If the policing context is any precursor, overcoming these political and social obstacles will be
unlikely.

E.g., BARKOW, supra note 133; see, e.g., Jonathan Simon, Millennials and the New Penology: Will
Generational Change in the U.S. Facilitate the Triumph of Risk Rationality in Criminal Justice, in Criminal
Justice, risk and Revolt against Uncertainty (2020).
201 Wiseman, supra note 56.
202 Elie Mystal, The Inevitable Whitelash Against Racial Justice Has Started, THE NATION, Aug. 31,
2020,
https://www.thenation.com/article/activism/blake-white-people-backlash/
[https://perma.cc/4XAH-LF3V]; Reggie Jackson, The Inevitability of a White Backlash to the
George Floyd Protests, MILWAUKEE INDEPENDENT, June 12, 2020, http://www.milwaukeeindependent.com/featured/inevitability-white-backlash-george-floyd-protests/
[https://perma.cc/BKD7-TD77].
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2. ‘Inaccurate’ Algorithms Objection203
Another objection that will be raised is that the algorithms designed under
the power-shifting model will be ‘inaccurate.’ Because the algorithms developed under this model would be derived from communal expertise, the fear
will be that the assessments produced by these algorithms would not validly
predict a defendant’s pretrial risk. A version of this concern is discussed by
Sandra Mayson, who warns that attempts to redress algorithmic bias by eliminating racially disparate inputs or altering the weights assigned to such inputs
without attending to empirical data about non-appearance or arrest for pretrial
crime risk producing inaccurate algorithms.204
This objection will be hard to overcome due to the importance that algorithm reformers place on accurate risk prediction. The idea that these algorithmic systems’ risk predictions outperform their human counterparts has been a
major selling point used by algorithm reformers.205 One response to this objection could be that currently employed algorithms are not “accurate” since
they produce predictive invalid predictions in relation to racially marginalized
defendants. But on a deeper level, this response fails to grapple with the fact
that the ‘inaccurate’ objection is tied to the importance that empirics plays in
the algorithm project. The truth is that algorithms solely derived from communal expertise or from a blending of communal and technocratic expertise
might not yield predictions that are as accurate of nonappearance or pretrial
crime as algorithms derived from an empirical model. Moreover, such algorithms may not yield results that could be defined as risk predictions. Such only
poses a problem if one presupposes that the notion of accurate algorithms will
remain tethered to a notion of public safety that is exclusively concerned with
the dangerousness that a defendant’s release poses to society. A power-shifting
model unlocks the potential that algorithms designed within it might pursue a
notion of public safety that concerns the safety of the defendant, their family,
and their community alongside society as a whole. Under this model of public
safety, accuracy looks different. That difference would be destabilizing both
for the algorithm project as well as the pretrial system itself rendering it hard
to imagine the power-shifting model’s implementation.

The Article uses the term “accuracy” to refer to whether the tool reliably predicts the likelihood of flight or pretrial crime for racially marginalized defendants as compared to White
defendants. This issue is generally referred to in the computer literature as “validity” of the
tool, but the Article uses “accuracy” since such aligns with the common use of the word.
204 Mayson, Bias supra note 3, at 2264-2265.
205 SHARAD GOEL, JENNIFER SKEEM, & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, THE ACCURACY, EQUITY,
AND JURISPRUDENCE OF CRIMINAL RISK ASSESSMENT 1-5 (2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=3306723.
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3. Rebellion of Bail Judges Objection
The final objection on the algorithm reformer’s side will concern bail
judges. Implementing the power-shifting model might cause bail judges to disregard the assessments produced by these algorithms. This concern is not theoretical. There has already been a “rebellion” on the part of bail judges when
it comes to heeding the risk predictions of currently employed pretrial algorithms. As Megan T. Stevenson and Jennifer L. Doleac have noted, the influence that a defendant’s risk score has on judicial discretion decreases the longer
the risk assessment tool is used in the jurisdiction.206 Moreover, these deviations tend to correlate around race and adversely affect racially marginalized
defendants. In a recent study on Kentucky bail decisions, Alex Albright found
that bail judges were more likely to override the recommended default for bail
bonds (based on risk scores) and impose harsher bond conditions on Black
defendants in comparison to similarly situated white defendants.207 Moreover,
Jessica Eaglin’s work has shown that sentencing judges are increasingly developing procedural rules to restrict the use of algorithms, which may be foreshadowing for the bail context.208 Given this climate, algorithms designed under the power-shifting model may exacerbate this trend, particularly in the context of elected judges, who may be primed to view their own assessments as
more democratically legitimate than those produced by these algorithms. Of
course, this risk may not materialize. Arguably the fact that these algorithms
would be designed by community members may encourage judicial compliance. Moreover, the rebellion of bail judges will not necessarily be abated by
the continuation of the current iteration of pretrial algorithmic governance.
However, the potential refusal of bail judges to rationalize their decision-making along the lines of the assessments produced by algorithms designed under
the power-shifting model poses an important obstacle.
B.

Community Side

On the other side, the power-shifting model may receive objections from
most impacted communities, particularly from those who reject the algorithm
project. For those critics, increased reliance on algorithmic decision-making,
regardless of who controls the design will inevitably reproduce racial stratification. Sean Hill takes this position contending that risk assessment is inextricably tied to the production of racial tropes that justify the over-detention of

Megan T. Stevenson & Jennifer L. Doleac, Algorithmic Risk Assessment in the Hands of Humans,
ECONSTOR (work in progress), https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/215249/1/dp12853.pdf
207 Alex Albright, If You Give a Judge a Risk Score: Evidence from Kentucky Bail Decisions (work in
progress),
https://thelittledataset.com/about_files/albright_judge_score.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AT5Q-7W9Q].
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206

46

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3835370

The Democratizing Potential of Algorithms?

Black defendants.209 In support of his position, he points to algorithms that are
currently in existence. His critique is emblematic of the ‘no-algorithm’ position
held by some members of most impacted communities, who resultingly prefer
the abolition of the entire pretrial system. Given how algorithmic decisionmaking has been employed to date, this critique is not easy to dismiss.
Moreover, having an algorithm-based approach to pretrial detention runs
counter to the individualized assessment that has been championed by some
community organizations. Any algorithm-based approach implicates the ageold debate about rules versus standards.210 In short, rules require a decisionmaker to apply a specified outcome to a set of facts.211 A standard requires that
a decision-maker perform an individualized assessment as to how a policy
should apply to a specific event.212 The preferability of either approach is context-specific and subject to substantial scholarly debate.213 The fact that algorithms employ a rule-based approach may garner opposition from those who
strongly believe that a defendant’s release or detention before trial should be
subject to an individualized assessment. It is true that one cost of adopting the
power-shifting model is that a defendant may not receive a purely individualized assessment at the bail stage, since their bail determination may, in part, be
informed by the outcome of an algorithmic system. As the actualization of the
power-shifting model is subject to buy-in by most impacted communities, the
no algorithm position presents an important barrier.
CONCLUSION
The growth of pretrial algorithmic governance presents a troubling challenge for racial justice. Present-day algorithms use factors that entrench racial

Hill II, supra note 34.
This Article only engages in this important debate to the extent that algorithmic systems
apply a rule-based approach to decision-making. For more information about the rules versus
standards debate, see generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976).
211 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58
(1992) (explaining that “legal directive is ‘rule’-like when it binds a decisionmaker to respond
in a determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering facts. Rules aim to confine the
decisionmaker to facts, leaving irreducibly arbitrary and subjective value choices to be worked
out elsewhere.”).
212 Id. at 58–59 (explaining that “[a] legal directive is ‘standard’-like when it tends to collapse
decisionmaking back into the direct application of the background principle or policy to a fact
situation . . . . Standards allow the decisionmaker to take into account all relevant factors or
the totality of the circumstances.”).
213 Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 428-29 (1985) (explaining the
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stratification by promoting harmful stereotypes of Black criminality and Black
over-incarceration. By so doing, they operate to maintain the structural disadvantage that denies full citizenship to members of low income Black communities in this country. As the debate around the racial effects of pretrial algorithmic governance continues, more attention must be paid to the input problem that this form of governance produces and entrenches. By shedding light
on this problem, the hope is that this Article adds to conversations underway
about the racial justice implications of the algorithm project. Resolving the
input problem is potentially realizable and holds latent possibilities for democratization and perhaps the radical reorientation of the pretrial system for most
impacted communities. Yet, the realization of this model would be in direct
conflict with the aims and goals of algorithm reformers, rendering it politically
impossible. Not only should this result curb enthusiasm for the algorithm project, but it should also cast doubt on the potential of resolving the racial effects
of currently employed algorithms by measures that do not position most impacted communities as the designers, implementers, stewards, and controllers
of the new technologies of today and tomorrow.
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